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PSC 207: Public Administration | PSC 306: Public Organizations

Richard J. Stillman (ed), Public Administration: Concepts & Cases, 7/e

Students' Outlines: Conceptual Readings | 7e Cases | 8e Cases | 9e Cases

 Discontinued indicates readings later dropped in 8th edition.
Thanks to contributors; compiled by Dr. Jeremy Lewis   Revised 3 Feb. 2015
Chapters: | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |

Stillman Chap. 1: Scope & Purpose
Case 1: John Bartlow Martin, "The Blast in Centralia No. 5."  (1948)
by Jeremy Lewis, from transparencies, ca. 1995; students' notes are below


Coal Dust.
WW2 manpower shortage: 59 yr avge.
Remote control: unions, company, inspection.
Regulation requires enforcement.
Patronage system, campaign funding system.
Blast kills 111, yet numerous warnings.
Attempted Solutions:
Investigating Commission.
Federal Response: Truman sent CMA from Navy.
Courts: corp. misdemeanors only.
Union outcry.
Congress failed.
1 Political scapegoat for Repub. machine.

Stillman II, The Blast in Centralia No. 5: A Mine Disaster No One Stopped
Notes by Blair Casebere and Katy Garren, spring 2015
111 miners were killed in a mine explosion.
Years before the explosion took place the miners had appealed in various directions for help, but received none from their gov’t—state or fed.l—nor their own union.
The Story
The Central Mine No. 5 was opened two miles away South of Centralia in 1907. It was owned by the Central Coal Company, an appendage of the Bell & Zoller Empire.
No Bell & Zoller officers or directors lived at Centralia.
Back in 1944 William Rowekamp, recording secretary of Local Union 52, prepared an official complaint, but the fed.l and state gov’t had recognized the danger of Mine No. 5 even earlier.
Even Earlier
Driscoll O. Scanlan was appointed the political job of mine inspector in 1941.
Scanlan considered Mine No. 5 as worst in his district and wrote numerous, extensive reports pleading to correct the mine before it had to be shut down.  Amongst his reports, he even suggested solutions, such as a sprinkler system throughout the mine, which would have dampened the coal dust and prevented the explosion.
Every 3 months from 1942-44, Scanlan repeated his recommendations to protect the miners.
A year beforehand, in 1941, Governor Green appointed Robert M. Medill as a Director of the mining board.
Scanlan’s inspection reports came to Medill’s department.
In general, this went on for three years.
The fed.l bureau lacked the power to force compliance; the Illinois Department possessed the power but failed to act.
In 1945, it appeared that something might be accomplished. Scanlan, took the unusual step of telephoning Medill at Springfield, who told him to write him a letter. Scanlan did.
This stiff letter was duly stamped “Received” at Springfield on Feb. 23, 1945.
A few days earlier a bad report came in and Medill finally entered the picture.
Medill bypassed the letter and, a week later, on March 7, 1945, he forwarded the response from William P. Young, the operating v.p of Bell & Zoller at Chicago, back to Scanlan.
The Response
“I would suggest that you ask the mine committee [of Local 52] to be patient a little longer, inasmuch as the coal is badly needed at this time.”
The miners told Scanlan till April 1st, but no longer.
On April 1st the pres. of Local Union 52 asked Scanlan to attend the Local’s meeting on April 4th.
That year of 1945 the union filed charges against Mine Manager Brown, asking the State Mining Board to revoke his certificate of competency.
The Board refused to revoke Manager Brown’s certificate.
By December of 1945 matters again came to a head. Again Local 52 tries to take matters into its own hands. On Dec. 12, the membership voted to prefer charges against both Mine Manager Brown and Superintendent Prudent.
A year later they were still running the same circles. Dec 10, 1946, Medill received a letter from an individual miner who charged the company’s mine examiner was not doing what the law required. Medill had just ignored another on of Scanlan’s letter not much earlier—which stated that he had sent a department investigator, who reported that the charges against Mine Manager Brown were true and that Mr. brown knew that the Superintendent Niermann promised to consult V-P Young that other hazards existed including dust.
This letter and one other, plus Young’s earlier equivocal response to Medill’s direct appeal, are the only company compliance letters on record.
In April 1947, Governor Green handpicked a ward leader to run for mayor and Medill backed him hard.
Scanlan was unaware that the Governor was in cahoots with Mr. Medill and wrote him a letter, asking for his aid.
Where Governor Green ultimately failed was not listening to or acting on the miner’s appeal to “save our lives.”
As the Chicago campaign came to a close, down at Centralia on March 18th Fed.l Inspector Prez was making another round of inspection.
Prez went home to write out his report and finished it on Saturday morning—which acknowledged that 17 hazards had been corrected, but marking 52 recommendations which had been made in November—and mailed the report to Vincennes office, which presumably began processing it Monday.
Finally, on March 25, of 1947, a form letter was signed to Mr. Brown to set forth Scanlan’s recommendations. However, the mine blew up that day at 3:26 p.m.
The Result
Medill performed an act of political loyalty, taking most of the blame
Because the law did not yet charge specific officers of the campaigns with legal responsibility, so it was easy for the company official to hide behind chain of command, which reaches up to the corporate finances in St. Louis.
Congress did nothing but order the Bureau of Mines to report next session on whether mine operators were complying voluntarily with fed.l inspectors’ recommendations.

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Stillman Chap. 2: Formal Structure of Bureaucracy.

George Lardner, Jr., "How Kristin Died" (Stillman pages 64-76)
(By Jamie Jordan, 2001)

The author is the father of Kristin, who was killed by Michael Cartier--her ex-boyfriend, who was under court order to stay away from her. This piece was written to show how our court system failed her--and could fail us.

I think that the best way for me to show the ugliness of this case and the court system is to write out a sort of time line.  Unfortunately it is long and his crimes are ugly. What is even more vile are the crimes committed by the police, probation officers, judges and others that we put our trust in--and so did Kristin.

1988 Arrested for burglary, sentenced to 6 months which he never served.

1989 Injected blood into a ketchup bottle.

Oct. 4, 1990 Went on a sledgehammer rampage; smashing through the bedroom wall and into a neighbor’s apartment. He also killed a kitten (that he had earlier thrown into a steaming hot shower and then shaved with a man’s razor.)*

Dec.1990 Assaulted Rose Ryan, back handing her and then chasing her down the sidewalk. He pushed her to the ground and started kicking her. When he stopped kicking her he told her that she had better get up or he would kill her. (He would also say this to Kristin.)

March 28, 1991 Rose called Michael’s probation officer, Tom Casey, after he threatened to kill her. She also took out a restraining order. Tom Casey also obtained a warrant for Michael’s arrest.

--Michael attacks Rose in the subway.

April 19, 1991 Attacks Rose with a pair of scissors.

April 29, 1991 Michael is finally picked up for the warrant that was issued a month ago.**

At the trial he is given 3 months for violating probation and 1 year for the subway attack but committed only 6 months.
Nov. 5, 1991 Cartier is released for good behavior and over crowding. Immediately taken in for 59 days for the ketchup incident the earlier burglary sentence is dropped. He serves 49 days.

Dec. 19 1991 Warrant goes out for contacting Rose by mail while he was in jail.

Jan. (Late.) 1992 In court he is ordered to attended a once a week class--Alternatives to Violence, instead of completing the one year term for the scissors incident.***

March (early) 1992 First beating against Kristin.

April 16, 1992 Last date, and another beating.

April 28, 1992 Cartier goes to Emerge (educational program for abusive men) will not tell the attendant the name of his probation officer and quickly leaves, taking the forms with him.

May (early) 1992 Cartier shows Leslie North (a friend) a gun he bought. May 7, 1992 Kristin calls Moeller, Cartier’s parole officer.

May 11, 1992 Kristin files an emergency one day restraining order. The next day she files a temporary one week order. ****

May 19, 1992 Court date for permanent restraining order. At which time he should have been arrested for contacting Kristin the night before.

May 30, Cartier shoots Kristin 3 times, killing her, then goes to his apartment and kills himself.

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Stillman Chap. 3: Environment, Ecology of Public Admin.

Michael Aron, "Dumping a $2.6 M on Bakersfield:
How Not to Build a Migratory Farm Workers' Clinic."
by Jeremy Lewis, from transparencies, ca. 1995.

Concept: ecology of admin.
 Mex-Am farm workers have skin diseases from pesticides, nutrition and dental roblems.
1970 Migrant Health Act, $11 M, Mondale.
"persons broadly rep've of all elements ... be given an opportunity to participate."
 HEW mandates fast program
 Money arrives in small CA town.
 Mandates local participation.
 Nixon decentralizing fed CS:
  Region IX, S.F. handles.
 No Chicano community group to be delegate agency.  20,000 there.
 BUT must spend: end of budget year.
KCLM (Kern County Liberation Movem't.)
 black group existed, got the $2.6 M.


 other community groups not consulted.
 medical group migrant clinic cut back.
 Reps complained.
Political Solutions:
HEW, & KCLM moderated in press conf's.
Kept grant thro' political skills.
KCLM board added medical professionals.
Clinic in migrant (Mex) area, not black.
KCLM assuaged with Retreat.
Newspaper: $2,500 junket cost.
Got medical dir, doctor attractive clinic, & trailers when med society closed.
2nd Dir Pineda was son of a worker.
BUT KCLM did not fit Mondale/Stevenson mandate for participation by clients.
KCLM fired Pineda, HEW reinstated.
KCLM changed to KC Health Ctee  (respectability.)
Campesinos formed CDLC,
but med dir failed his medical board.


KCHC fires Pineda for favoring mexicans.
Demos, firings, paint splatters, shots, HEW telegrams.
Medical society wants own clinic.
HEW offers to pay medical society to move.
Black & mex boards would merge.
 Mex would operate with docs.
 Blacks 'financial intermediaries.'
 $400,000 spent to date on Weedpatch.
 But ongoing protests.
 blacks unwilling to concede
 campesinos illiterate & overworked
 docs not bilingual
  social expt, not real health delivery.
 and it's worse in urban areas!

Michael Aron, "Dumping $2.6 Million on Bakersfield"
(Or How Not to Build a Migratory Farm Worker's Clinic)
Vance McBrayer, 2001

·       About a huge chunk of federal money being dumped into a small town
very quickly, and the mass chaos that soon followed.
·       March, 1970 - Congress passed the Migrant Health Act, appropriating
$11 million for migrant programs in fiscal 1970.
·       The legislation had been passed late in the fiscal year, giving the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) only a few months to
spend the money or else forfeit it back to the Treasury.
·       HEW looked for large groups of chicanos to dump the money on and let
them run the program.
·       With time running out, HEW dumped the $2.6 million to the Kern County
Liberation Movement in Bakersfield, a group of black citizens who had
only been formed for 6 months.
·       All the local health established caught word of this, and the chaos
began because they didn't understand why anyone would give $2.6 million
to a bunch of poor people with no administration experience.

Creative Fumbling
·       By July, project funds were suspended pending "restructuring" of the KCLM board.
·       However, HEW kept sending funds to KCLM
·       After 3 months of not finding a program director, HEW decided to take
over, appointing Vincent Garza, a Mexican-American, as director.
·       This turned the ordeal into a race issue.

Dude Ranch Junket
·       Garza's first order of business was to find a location for the health center.
·       Garza began exploring areas of mostly Mexican-Americans, but KCLM
wanted it to be located in an area of mostly blacks.
·       KCLM felt betrayed, and several board members resigned

Hmm…Federal Funding
·       Weedpatch was finally chosen as the spot for the health clinic.
·       The clinic was setup with all new equipment in a snazzy clinic; not
what you would expect when you hear "migrant health clinic"

Chicanos in the Wings
·       A "sub-board" of campesinos was created to take over if anything were to go wrong
·       KCLM were upset to say the least; first, they "lost" the clinic itself, and now they were about to be loose control over it.

Culturally Unfit
·       Just before the KCLM was suppose to turn control over to CDLC (the campesino sub-board), they fired the program director, and then refused to turn control over to CDLC.
·       Picketing ensued.

Bent in the Fields
·       A compromise was struck.  The CDLC board would be absorbed into the
KCHC board.  Nine people would be jointly chosen to be a separate board-within-a-board who would serve in a "policy-recommending" capacity.

If Weedpatch Had Movies
·       That should have been the end of problems, but they continued to continue (if that makes sense).
·       Controversy was rampant in everything from hiring and firings to petty theft, resignations, and false sexual rumors.
·       This situation went from an attempt to provide poor people with better medical care to a fight for power with Bakersfield.

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3.2: B.J. Moore, “A Retrospective: Weedpatch Revisited”
R. Walker Garrett, 2003; another version is below
 The Clinca Sierra Vista, formerly known as the Clinca de los Campesinos, was portrayed by Aron as a failure because of the lack of its administration’s ability to properly manage their health care organization. Under new management, the Clinca Sierra Vista has thrived because of the entrepreneurial strategies implemented by the new executives. Under the Executive Director, Steve Shilling, Clinica has expanded its target group to include the aged, mothers, children, HIV/AIDS patients, various ethnic groups, the homeless, and pregnant and parenting teens. Instead of seeking political publicity, the clinic took on a lower profile in order to gain better leaders on the board as well as better management within the organization. Looking for new methods of funding, Clinica has received  financial support from WIC (Women, Infants, and Children Outreach Program) and MCOP (Maternal Child Outreach Program) which provided the resources to start a satellite dental clinic in 1978. The business side of the non profit organization takes on continual adaptations with an ever flowing process of adjustment, change, and compromise.

These adaptations occur through four strategies to include: Continually branching out, developing an effective management team, adopting the local cultural values, and taking risks at the top.

 With Clinca Sierra Vista expanding all the time, it must keep up strong grants and contracts to maintain positive cash flows. Approximately thirty grants and contracts as well as various federal, state, local, and private funding and partnerships support the clinic.  Clinca Sierra Vista has created a network of freestanding, organized clinics, which are known for their aesthetic attractiveness, funded off low-interest mortgages. A major entrepreneurial strategy that has worked for Clinica has been manipulating the legislative agenda at federal and state levels in order to support growth and organizational survival. As in business, great rewards come with great risks. The flourishing of Clinca Sierra Vista has been seen through Steve Schillings daring with risks and company expansions and enhancement programs. A new program which he instituted involved a computer-based financial system which was able to analyze service delivery patterns while tracking and evaluating overall program effectiveness. Such innovations which might be considered risky with a not for profit organization have led to the immense success in the past twenty five years of Clinca Sierra Vista.

All information derived from:  Moore, BJ. “A Retrospective: Weedpatch Revisited.” Public Administration: Concepts and Cases. (2000): 96-98.

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B.J. Moore, "A Retrospective: Weedpatch Revisited"
Kristin Goodrich, 2001

Background: named Clinica Sierra Vista
                   location ranges around San Joaquin Valley in California
                   date starts in 1972 cont. to present

Importance: proves efficiency in well organized public administration

Resources: 22 million dollar budget, 400 employees, and 11 clinics

Objective: to provide healthcare to the underprivileged

People that benefit: began applying to farmers in the region, but has expanded to provide help to
mostly underprivileged Hispanics, pregnant and teen mothers, the elderly and the homeless

Services provided: family planning, counseling for pregnant and parenting teens, a mobile van for
reaching the homeless, school based health clinics, and dental care

Funding: receives grants and contracts from 30 federal, state and local  partnerships, in addition
to receiving funds from WIC, women, infants and children program,and MCOP, maternal child
outreach program

Reason for 25 yr. success: 1. continually branching out
                                        2. developing an effective management team
                                        3. adopting the  local cultural values
                                       4. taking risks at the top local and private funding partnerships

Additional reasons for success: working with the legislative agenda has  been instrumental in
the growth and organizational survival and the strength of a strong CEO, Steve Schilling, and his
push for grants from the Bureau of Primary Health Care and in 98' the accreditation from the
Joint Commission for the accreditation of Healthcare Organization, finally, the introduction to a
computer based financial system has made it easier to analyze service delivery patterns and to
evaluate program effectiveness

Challenges to administration: scarce organizational resources

Solution: long term tenures and strategic planning { this is has allowed  the Clinica to operate for
25 yrs}

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Stillman Chap. 4: Political Environment & Power.

Case Study 4: “The Last Flight of Space Shuttle Challenger”
Sierra R. Turner, 2005
            “The Last Flight of Space Shuttle Challenger” describes the events leading up to the worst disaster
            ever experienced by America’s space program- at least when the 7th edition of this book was
            published in 2000.

            On January 28, 1986 the seven member crew of the Challenger began their flight at 11:38 a.m. only to see it
            end 73 seconds later when the Challenger exploded in a fireball of hydrogen and oxygen
            propellants which destroyed the rocket and the space shuttle.

            In this case study Professor Charles probes the causes behind the disaster. He argues that it is far
            more important “to develop an appreciation of the human side of the management and its influence
            on the Shuttle disaster.” Charles concluded “engineers not having management responsibilities
            viewed the data regarding the O-ring performance at cold temperatures quite differently than did
            management personnel.”

            Purpose of this case study:
            1.     demonstrate the organizational failings that resulted in the Challenger catastrophe.
            2.     provide an analysis of organizational failings.

            The organizational failings included such phenomena as an environment of pressured
            decision-making, lucrative contracts, Congressional funding, and bureau-political infighting within
            NASA and among NASA, the military and other governmental agencies competing for space dollars.

            The analysis of the organizational failings will present several reasons, from a
            social-psychological perspective on how an agency such as NASA, with its excellent reputation
            for management, technology, and safety cold produce such a catastrophic event.

            NASA= The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is the governmental agency
            responsible for the development and management of the Space Shuttle program. NASA has
            awarded several private firm contracts with the purpose of developing and designing the STS.
            These private firms include:
            1.     Rockwell International Corporations Space Transportation Systems Division,
            2.     Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace,
            3.     The Morton Thiokol Corporation, and
            4.     Rocketdyne.

            Managerial responsibility for the shuttle program was divided by NASA into 3 field areas which
            1.     Management of the orbiter was the responsibility of the Johnson Space Center in Houston,
            2.     Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama assumed the responsibility for the Solid
            Rocket Boosters, the orbiter’s main engines, and the External Tank.
            3.     Responsibility of assembling the Shuttle compressors was given to the Kennedy Space Center
            in Merritt Island Florida.

            The Challenger was originally scheduled for lift-off in July 1985, and a scrubbed mission because
            of high winds at Kennedy Space Center on January 27, 1986 but it was rescheduled for launch on
            January 28, 1986.

            There were a series of meetings before the launch on the 28th of January and they all dealt with
            different aspects of the mission and whether or not to launch.

                      Meeting 1:
            During the short meeting following the Mission Management team’s decision to scrub the January
            27th lift-off, no mention of the Solid Rocket Boosters, or the earlier O-ring erosion found on
            previous shuttle flights launched in cold weather was made, even though temperatures were
            expected to drop into the low twenties overnight.

                      Meeting 2:
            Discussion at  this meeting on January 27th concentrated on the effect the expected cold weather
            would have on such things as eye wash and shower water, water drains, the suppression systems,
            and the overpressure water trays. At this meeting it was decided that the orbiter heaters should be
            activated, but again there was no mention of the Solid Rocket Booster O-rings.

                      Meeting 3:
            There was a phone conversation between Mr. Ebeling and Allan McDonald in which Mr. Ebeling
            expressed his and the other engineers’ misgivings regarding the performance of the O-rings in the
            Solid Rocket Booster field joints at cold temperatures. Result: Mr. McDonald contacted the
            Kennedy Space Center launch operations center in an effort to collect temperature data.

                      Meeting 4:
            At this meeting Thiokol representatives voiced their concerns about the performance of the Solid
            Rocket Booster O-rings…it appears that Thiokol recommended that the launch be delayed until
            noon or later when the temperature was higher.

                      Meeting 5:
            Charts presented at the meeting included information regarding the following:
            1.     a history of O-ring blow-by and erosion in the Solid Rocket Booster joints at previous flights and
            2.     the results of subscale testing and static tests on the O-rings.

            All of the information presented did not convince two of the NASA administrators that the cold
            weather would result in a slowed O-ring, blow-by, or ultimate disaster of the Challenger.

            In conclusion, NASA and ultimately its contractors left the traditionally conservative design,
            development, and testing stage behind. Result: they began to rationalize away, they failed to
            communicate, they improperly analyzed data, and generally became sloppy in their work and
            overconfident of their successes due to past shuttle flights….

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Stillman Chap. 5: Intergovernmental Relations.

Wichita Confronts Contamination
Charles U Walters, Spring ‘07
  • The city of Wichita, Kansas was sitting on a contaminated underground lake. When the news came out, the city began losing investors, banks would not give a loan, and residents were unable to sell their homes.
  • One year after the implementation of the program life began to return to normal.



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    Susan Rosegrant, "Wichita Confronts Contamination"
    by (Jessica Fails)

    -In Wichita, Kansas in 1990 the business distracted was faced with urban decline.
        -there was a renewal project that involved in improving public leverage; it was a $375 million dollar project.
        -in downtown Wichita there was hazardous chemicals that caused cancer and other health problems that was found in the private and industrial areas.
        -the banks became aware of the chemicals, they began asking for soil and water samples, before giving out loans.
        -in june a local manufacturer( Coleman Co. Inc.) approached the city's legal department for advice about the contamination problem that they discovered in routine testing.
        -the Kansas Department of Health and Environment reported that that Wichita was sitting on a underground lake polluted by various industries.
        -city manger Chris Cherches estimated that it would cost $20 million and take at least 20 years to clean up the contamination.
        -the Wichita community didn't take the contamination serious, the contamination was so serious that it was moving a foot a day.
        -the economic impact of the contamination had the community up in a uproar.
        -Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) reported that 508 areas of businesses as Potentially Responsible Parties(PRP) under the Superfund law.
        -the Superfund law is where the hold all the potential business liable for the cleanup cost regardless of whether they contributed to contamination.
        -the banks relining had impact on commercial and residential property owners.
        -Chris Cherches had to come up with a plan: had two major priorities 1) to begin the clean up process as soon as possible, 2) and to prevent property values
        -he to convinced the banks to resume lending in the area
        -Cherches had to come up wit a third option,  he proposed that the city take full responsibility for the contamination, they would attempt to sidestep the time and resources normally spent on Superfund- related litigation and to create mechanism to get the banks to lend in the contaminated are again.
        -Cherches faced a barrier for the problem and it was finding a way to finance it
            Cherches list of financing alternatives
                -Establishing a special assessment district
                -Issue bonds
                -Create a tax increment finance district
                -County pay entire cost, with state assistance
                - Impose a statewide tax
        -Cherches concluded that creating a tax increment finance (TIF) district would be most equitable and politically palatable way to raise funds
        -WIchita proposed that the tax be called a decrement plan, the city would devalue all property in the pre-contimated level under the argument that the city would create a plan to restore the lost value.   The difference would create an increment to set aside  each year to finance the cleanup.
        -Cherches won the support from everyone to get the spill cleaned up

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    Stillman Chap. 6: Internal Dynamics & informal Group.

    Jennifer Egan “Uniforms in the Closet”
    By: Liz Arnett, 2003

     The “Uniforms in the Closet” by Jennifer Egan is a case study about the federal law known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue” and whether or not this law helps homosexuals in the military. Egan describes this law as follows, “Under ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ homosexuals (or bisexuals) may serve as long as they tell no one about their sexual orientation, refrain from ‘homosexual acts’ and forgo homosexual marriage. The policy bars the military from questioning service members about their sexual orientation or investigating them without credible information that they have engaged in homosexual conduct” (Egan, 171). Egan concentrates on the Marine Corps because this is the section of the military that is known for its homophobia. She meets and writes about more than one homosexual in her article, but she concentrates the most on a man named “R.”
     “R” is a Marine Corps officer who has been a “mustang” which is an enlisted marine that has changed to a commissioned officer, a commanding officer and a general’s aide. Even though he has all these qualifications under his belt, “R” has to constantly worry about someone finding out about his sexuality because if anyone ever did know he is gay, he would automatically be dishonorably discharged, which leaves you with nothing. Then the question raised is why does he not feel safe with the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. Egan states that the answer is this, “For one thing, is has turned discrimination against homosexuals- formerly just a military policy- into Federal Law. And by forcing homosexuals to remain invisible, R. says, the policy deprives gay military people of any chance to prove themselves and begin to dispel the prejudices against them” (Egan, 173).
     Ever since this policy has become Federal Law, the rate of discharging homosexuals from the military has risen 67 percent. Another surprising fact is now that there are new rules to how you are allowed to investigate people who might be gay have changed since this policy is a law; over 1,379 command violations have been documented in just the first four years it has been in place. This statistics have made the gays in the military to live fake lives just to protect their job. R. talks about many officers who have “stunt babes” who are women pretending to be these gay men’s girlfriends. R. even talks about a woman named M. who got married just to hide her sexual preference. This fake life that R. has to live is very bothersome to him because the Marine Corps has a Core Value card that includes, “ ‘Honor,’ begins the test, which also includes the words ‘integrity,’ ‘Responsibility’ and ‘Accountability’” (Egan, 174). How can these homosexuals feel completely apart of the Marine Corps and carry around this Core Value card, and yet be expected to lie.
     The argument that proved to be the biggest problem with the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” law is the section of the law that states that one cannot be investigated without credible information. R. questions what this “credible information” is exactly and he uses the case against a female named Harden who was enlisted in the Air Force. In Harden’s case her roommate claimed that, “Harden owed her money forged letters in Harden’s name stating that she was gay and gave them to her commanding officer” (Egan, 175). Even though Harden’s roommate admitted to forging these letters, and Harden passed the polygraph test and had three ex boyfriends testify, but the separation board still found her guilty and she was discharged. This ruling will always be on her record which can be looked at by any employer for the rest of her life.
     The “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” federal law is proven to be insufficient in this case study. Egan shows how gays in the military are more persecuted now than before because this law has brought special attention to the fact that there are gays in the military. Just because straight people might feel more comfortable not knowing the sexuality of one of their fellow men/women, that still does not justify the mistreatment that R. mentions through out this case study. R. best describes this federal law in the following quotation, “‘Clinton thought that he was doing us this big favor,’ R. says, ‘and all he did was build a brick wall around the closet’” (Egan, 174).

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    Stillman Chap. 7: Decisionmakers & Subsystems.

    Stillman, Case Study 7,
    Elaine Sciolino and Ethan Bronner, “The Decision to Bomb the Serbs”
    Outline By Walker Garrett (2005)

    Background: Yugoslavian nation established in 1918, and after WWII, Marshall Tito created a
    united Yugoslavian; however, upon his death in 1980, economic decline and ethnic rivalries led
    to conflicts. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic encouraged the Serbs to take their place as
    the primary nation in the region of broken up Yugoslavia.

          Kosovo: historic ethnic and religious differences, sacred ground to Christian

          Serbs numbering 10.3 million. It is also the site of ancient Orthodox Christian
          Monasteries and a revered battlefield between Turks and Christians.

          Kosovo’s two million inhabitants are ethnic Albanian Muslims. In 1989, Milosevic took
          away Kosovo’s autonomy and established Marshall Law. The Kosovo Liberation was
          formed as a guerrilla movement to defend Kosovo’s Muslim population.

    During time of Milosevic’s massacres in 1998 and the breakout of open warfare, Clinton was
    undergoing impeachment investigations by the Congress over the Sex Scandals, so the
    Executive could not get the focus on reacting to the aggression in Kosovo.

    Gen. Wesley K. Clark, NATO commander and Gen. Klaus Naumann, chairman of the NATO
    military council confronted Milosevic with photos of his massacres and issued threats of NATO
    air strikes. Milosevic rebutted the allegations as part of a terrorist plot.

    Dec. 12, 1992, the Bush Administration had warned Milosevic of unilateral military action if he took action against Kosovo.

    A peace conference in Dayton, OH ended the Bosnia war during the Clinton Adm.

    Robert S. Gelbard was U.S. envoy to Milosevic, and he castigated him for the killings in 1998,
    and expressed that Milosevic was strengthening the KLA.

    During this time, not only were the impeachment investigations going on, but the Clinton foreign
    policy team was focused on Russia’s economic implosion and Presidential visits to China and Africa.

    An Albanian political leader, Mr. Rugova met with Clinton and Gore to implore military
    intervention to prevent more violence in Kosovo. An alliance of nations formed, and NATO
    drew up military plans which led to Milosevic making promises of concessions.

    Options: Air strikes, 200,000 ground forces, Cruise Missiles
    The idea came for proposed NATO-Russian cooperation, a ground force divided
    between the two as an international military presence and police force.

    Oct. 1998- The President outlined the plan for NATO air strikes, the Congress made clear that
    a commitment would be made to air power, not deployment of American soldiers.

    Milosevic agreed to withdraw most forces from Kosovo, permitted 1800 unarmed international
    inspectors, but his catch was that NATO would lift the order that gave authority to launch strikes immediately.

    Oct. agreement fell apart, Serbs prepared for offensive, but the KLA, more confident now as being backed up by the American Air force, reclaimed abandoned territory and mounted continuous small-scale attacks.

    Jan. 16, 1999, 45 bodies found from a massacre, this led to U.S. and Europe public opinion towards addressing Milosevic

    Jan. 19, Sec. of State Albright brought new plan threatening bombing if NATO demands were
    not met to include NATO troop deployment and granting Kosovo broad autonomy.

    Bombing began March 24, 1999 after Milosevic ignored threats and denied the massacres.

    Useless meetings at Rambouillet, Milosevic didn’t even attend, failed to convince Albanians of KLA to sign a deal. This took pressure off the Serbs since the Kosovo Liberation Army wouldn’t agree to the terms.

    After being acquitted on Feb. 12, Clinton began to focus on Kosovo.

    March 18, the ethnic Albanians signed a peace plan in Paris, Serbs wouldn’t sign, leads to air strikes.

    What did it take to decide to bomb the Serbs?
    It took the freeing up of the Executive office from impeachment to get the President more involved; the KLA had to leverage the international community by cooperating with the peace deals, showing the unwillingness of the Serbs to negotiate; a series of photographed massacres had to be found and evidenced; failed negotiations by NATO; build-up of Serbian forces around Kosovo.

    Stillman Case, 8: MOVE disaster
    Ryan Rice

    I. History of MOVE and events leading up to disaster.

    A. Founded in the 1970s, in Philadelphia by Vincent Leaphart.
    1. V. Leaphart changed his name to John Africa and all of his followers too on the surname “Africa”.
    2. Created tension with landlords for unsanitary practices and with police for causing profane and provocative disturbances.
    3. The mayor of Philadelphia is former police commissioner, Frank Rizzo, known for tough law enforcement.
    a. favored by whites for being aggressive against crime.
    b. disliked by blacks and journalists for alleged police brutality and violations of civil liberties.
    4. Police convince MOVE member to surrender weapons and vacate home after utility bill remain unpaid.
    5. MOVE members refuse to leave upon arrival date for their departure.
    a. police begin to demolish house in order to drive members out.
    b. MOVE member fires upon police, from basement window, killing one and wounding eight others.
    6. Nine months later, MOVE members move into new house and begin harassing neighbors again.
    7. W. Wilson Goode is elected mayor after serving as Managing Director under William J. Green, JR.
    8. Two years later police plan to drive MOVE members from fortified home backfires resulting in death of 11 move members and the destruction of 61 homes.
    II. Two Paradoxes
    A. Delay followed by haste.
    1. Mayor Goode hesitated to act in hopes to resolve problems without conflict.
    2. Finally decides to forcibly drive MOVE members from house is a very short amount of time.
    B. Arms-length action by a hands-on mayor.
    1. Mayor Goode was very involved with citizens and paid almost excessive attention to detail
    2. Before final conflict, the mayor held only two brief meeting during which no details were discussed and during the conflict the mayor was a surprising distance from the scene.
    III. Psychological reasons for actions taken by Mayor Goode.
    A. Defensive Avoidance
    1. Occurs in time when there is no extreme pressure to change an existing policy even though its consequences are unfavorable.
    2. Symptoms include procrastination, passing the buck, bolstering.
    B. Hypervigilance is “the strong desire to take action in order to alleviate emotional tension.
    IV. Three Decisional Conflicts: ...
    Prose version:
    In 1970 a group known as MOVE, lead by Vincent Leaphart (later know as John Africa) began as a protest organization.  The group had radical and profane forms of protest and living, which upset neighbors and landlords.  Tension began to form between the MOVE members and the Philadelphia police, under Mayor Frank Rizzo.  Mayor Rizzo was known for his aggressive style of crime fighting.  He was liked by white, but disliked by blacks and journalists for allegedly allowing the police force to violate civil liberties.  Because of the radical and profane manner in which MOVE protested, the police attempted to disband the group on numerous occasions.  In May of 1978 the police believed that they had reached an agreement with the group to leave the neighborhood only to find them refusing a month later.  On that date, August 1, the police attempted to drive them out of the house, at which time the offices were fired upon—one officer was killed and eight others were wounded.  After nine members were sentenced to prison terms for their part in the shooting, the group disappeared until 1983.  In 1980 Mayor Rizzo was replaced by William J. Green, Jr., who appointed W. Wilson Goode as Managing Director.  Goode build a nearly flawless resume and reputation and in 1983 was elected mayor of Philadelphia.  The MOVE group began its ranting once again and continued through 1984 and into the spring of 1985.  Over the course of these years the mayor tried peaceful ways of reaching out to the organization, but made no progress.  On May 13, 1985 a confrontation between the group and the Philadelphia police resulted in the death of eleven members of the MOVE group, as well as the destruction of 61 homes.  As it happened the police believed that they could set off explosives on the roof to drive the members out, but an unexpected fire started.  The fire officials and chief of police felt that it was not dangerous, but the fire soon raged out of control killing all but two of the people inside.  It spread to 61 adjacent homes and left 250 people homeless.
        Stillman identifies two paradoxes in the case.  The first was “delay followed by haste”.  This correlates with the fact that the mayor waited for nearly two years before acting.  When he finally did act, it was in a hurried, unprepared way.  The plan that was developed was flawed, lacking proper communication and resources, and it was not followed properly.  The second paradox is that the formerly hands-on mayor was very hands-off in this instance.  Goode was reported to have been “annoying” about his attention to detail.  Though when the time came to act, Goode held only two high-level meetings during which the details of the plan were not discussed.
         Stillman refers to the research of psychologists Irving Janis and Leon Mann to explain the reasons for Goode atypical behavior.  Janis and Mann state that when a decision maker is faced with an emotion, consequential, no-win choice, he or she depends upon hope and time.  When the decision maker sees realistic hope of finding a solution superior to all of the risky options, that person is following a desirable patter called vigilance, according to Janis and Mann.  When the decision maker loses hope of finding an acceptable option, he or she is demonstrating either defensive avoidance or hypervigilance.  The symptoms of defensive avoidance are procrastination, passing the buck, and bolstering.
    Stillman also identifies three decisional conflicts for Goode.  First of all, Mayor Goode is a devout Christian and has always looked to settle differences with out violence or conflict.  His first problem is that he does not want to responsible for the death of anyone else.  Goode’s second problem is that he allows his police force, in which he has no faith in and is notorious for using excessive force and brutality, to handle the situation.  Finally Goode is in a situation in which he is a former civil rights leader fighting against a group that is predominately black.  Though he can identify with them in that sense, he does not like them because they are the opposite of all of the thing that he stands for.
         In conclusion, Stillman has a number of ways to prevent such decision making disasters.  Effective communication methods should be implemented and education for public managers should have a greater focus on psychological decision making.  Janis and Mann recommend embedding preventive strategies in organizational standard operating procedures.  The three steps, Stillman includes for reducing vulnerability are: a)learn to recognize the symptoms of defective decision making, b)be able to identify the central no-win dilemma or dilemmas, c)learn to grasp all problems firmly even when all options entail distasteful co

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    Stillman Chap. 8: Decisionmaking & Incremental Choice.

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    Stillman Chap. 9: Communication.

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    Case Study: William J. Vizzard, "Waco"
    Amy West

    I.  Background
    The background of the community of Mount Carmel originates with Victor Houteff, who had left
    the Seventh Day Adventist Church.  This group was neither militant or armed.  When he died his
    the group divided part following his wife, part following Ben Roden.  The majority of the group
    followed Roden in the end, and upon his death they followed his wife.  Until a young man,
    Vernon Howell (22) begins a sexual relationship with her (a 71 year old woman) beginning a
    contest for control of the group.  A gun battle occurred.  Howell obtained control of the
    compound.  Howell then comes to be known as David Koresh and for nine years ran the
    compound.  In such time he declared all the men celibate and all the woman his wives, engaging
    in sexual relations with the girls as young as ten.  In May 1992 the ATF establish probable
    cause.  The weeks and months following the Waco incident probed the most trying in ATF

    II. The Decision
    Viewed in the context of organizational routines formed by structure, culture, environment, and
    task and as a series of interrelated but distinct decisions by individuals within ATF, the raid
    becomes understandable, though not essentially defensible.  Davidians were ordering numerous
    kits of replacement parts for M-16 machine guns.  Coupled with orders with statements from
    former members and reports of machine gun fire, given probable cause they got the search
    warrant; this was normal procedure for the agents.  US Attorney's office said to proceed with
    federal action.  The decision to investigate Koresh reflected the application of organizational
    routine in a classic sense.

    III. Why the Raid?
    The difference in reation is derived from three seperate causes.  Use of coercive force, fear of
    ATF serving a political agenda, and the civil libertarians with conflit between the state and
    unpopular religious views.

    IV. The decision to Use Dynamic Entry
    How the warrant should be served was the question and they had two options both so violated
    the values and routines of the field agents that top level management would have had to invoke
    them.  The HRT was clearly the most highly trained, best equipped law enforcement tactical
    group in the US.  The operation might well have been beyond their capabilities and likewise
    ended in disaster, ATF would have been politically buffered.  Under faulty information they
    thought the men would be at work and unarmed for the attack.

    V. The Plan
    The final plan was to serve the arrest and search warrants at 10:00 am on Monday, March 1,
    1993.  Planners made extensive preparations for emergency medical care of any injured
    persons.  After assembling in Waco, the entire army's urban warfare training  facilities at nearby
    Fort Hood, Texas.  Army Special Forces advisers critiqued and advised the rehearsals and made
    suggestions for improvements.

    VI.  The Execution
    April 19, 1993 agents of the FBI hostage and rescue team, injected tear gas into the compound
    and occupants responded by lighting multiple fires.  The fires and the self inflicted gun shot
    wounds resulted in the death of over seventy occupants including a number of children.  The
    subsequent trials in the US District court resulted in the conviction of several Davidian survivors
    on weapons and manslaughter charges but acquittal on murder and murder conspiracy charges.

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    Stillman Chap. 10: Executive Management & Effectiveness.

    Case 10: Langewische, The Lessons of ValuJet 592
    Ryan Rice, 2003

         In May of 1996, ValuJet flight 592 crashed into the Florida Everglades less than thirty minutes into its return flight to Atlanta.  As reported by the radar controller at Miami Departure, 592 requested,” immediate return to Miami” at 2:10 p.m., was given permission and placed into a gradual returning pattern.  592 reported smoke in the cockpit and radar control acknowledge and quickened to the descendent into Miami.  The plane suddenly banked left and dove.  It was later estimated that 592 dropped 6,400 feet in thirty-two seconds.  Then the plane pulled out of its dive and leveled off, however its altitude was now only a thousand feet and in the ensuing seconds it banked to the right and crashed into the mud at approximately 500 miles per hour.

    Stillman simplistically describes the three types of airplane accidents as a) procedural  b)engineered and  c)system accident.  The first, procedural, entails a single obvious mistake that can be understood immediately and in simple terms.  These mistakes include flying in thunderstorm or with ice on the wings, premature descent or a loss of control due to fear or boredom.  The second, engineered, describes surprising failures in material that should have been detected by designers or test pilots.  Stillman reports that these mistakes lead to examination and result in tangible solutions.  Finally, systems accidents are much more complicated accidents which may fall beyond the reach of conventional solutions.

    The sociologist, Charles Perrow has coined the term “normal accidents” which describes the same things as system accidents.  Perrow’s “normal accidents” describe those accident which result from, as Stillman puts it, “the confusion that lies within the complex organizations with which we manage our dangerous technologies.  Perrow also claims that Murphy ’s Law is wrong – What can go wrong usually goes right.

    Inferno in the Air
         All planes are equipped with oxygen generators; small steel canisters which create a chemical reaction to produce oxygen in case the plane lose cabin pressure.  These steel canisters have a shelf life and ValuJet had contracted SabreTech to remove and replace the canisters on a number of their DC-9s.  ValuJet gave SabreTech explicit instructions for the removal of the canisters as well as warnings of fire associate with the devises.  SabreTech decided to ship the expired canisters back to Atlanta with the planes.  The canisters were placed in cardboard boxes and loaded in the cargo hold, on top of functional generators.  This mistake in judgment along with the negligence of the shipping clerk and the ramp agent allowed for the canisters to be lift in the cargo hold, later catching fire and causing the crash of the 592.

    The Hunt for Blame
         David Hinson, FAA administrator at the time, in the wake of the crash defended ValuJet and in turn brought the blame to the FAA.  Though the FAA was running the normal level of check on the ValuJet, there had been concern, inside the FAA that the airline was expanding too fast.  The FAA launched an extensive investigation into ValuJet and the cause of the crash.  The Airline was grounded and later returned to the sky under a new name, AirTran.  SabreTech was not able to survive the investigations and closed its doors in 1997

    A “Normal Accident”
         Perrow has “interactive complexity” and “tight coupling” which he uses to describe certain processes.  “Interactive complexity” basically describes a domino effect of complicated parts.  In large systems, the combination of small failures in nearly infinite.  The lack of slack in this domino effect is what Perrow calls tight coupling.

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    Stillman Chap. 11: Personnel Motivation & Culture.

    "Admiral Boorda's War"
    Carly Nichols

    This reading covers the life, career, and events leading to the suicide of
    Admiral Mike Boorda, the United States Navy's Chief of Naval Operations during
    the Clinton administration.  This reading tackles the conflict between tradition
    and Washington politics.

    Events leading to suicide
    Tailhook was a military scandal in 1991, that old navy officers measured with
    Pearl Harbor in its ability to destroy the US Navy's rep..  Nearly three hundred
    naval aviator's careers have been destroyed or ended by Tailhook.  The scandal
    brought women in combat;mandatory career-long sensitivity training;and
    politicians into the Navy's sacred promotion process.

    The Tailhook convention occurred on the weekend of Sept. 5 through the 8th in
    1991.  Enlisted men forced enlisted women through a clothes-tearing, flesh
    grabbing gauntlet at a convention attended mostly by the Navy's senior officers.

     Strippers were also hired and usually danced for them totally nude and
    performed fellatio on the officers while the others watched.

    This scandal set the stage for Admiral Boorda to be appointed by Clinton.  He
    was not old Navy.  He was a Jew.  He had never been in combat.  He loved the
    politics of Washington.  He was the quintessential bureaucrat.  The perfect
    leader to the seemingly new sensitive politically correct Navy.  He should have
    bolstered the Navy's rep. among women and minorities.

    2.Rachel Hansen
    Rachel Hansen was in flight training school and was dropped from her flight
    training because of her inability to perform and to respond to criticism.  She
    appealed this decision.  Then, the decision was affirmed to be correct by her
    commanding officer, a Navy review board,and the Inspector General of the Navy
    and the Department of Defense.  Then she appealed again to the Navy's top
    aviator, a well respected Vice-chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stan Arthur.
    He also backed the previous decisions.

    Hansen did not give up the fight.  She claimed that the reason for the drop was
    because she had filed a sexual harassment suit against an officer a year earlier.

    When Boorda came into office, to appease Hansen and, he thought, solve the
    situation, he offered Hansen a job with him in Washington to keep her quiet.
    This caused Stan Arthur, a very very popular Admiral to resign his post and
    retire.  This situation did not sit well with the Navy brass.  They saw Boorda's
    actions as trading an Admiral for a complaining ensign who was a woman on top of
    that.  He also reversed the findings of some of the Navy's top men with that one
    job offer.  He would later admit it to be the greatest mistake of his career.

    3.Boorda was seen wearing two combat "v's", a symbol of valor in war.  Newsweek
    reporters noticed this and investigated.  They found out that he had never been
    in combat and asked for an interview to question him about the situation.  This
    would have definitely rubbed everyone in the Navy the wrong way.  The Navy's top
    man wearing medals that he had not earned.

    ----Directly following Newsweek's request for an interview, Boorda drove home
    and shot himself in the chest, killing himself. He could not take the
    controversy any longer.  Many top figures in the Navy point to his suicide as
    the event that ended the large sexual harassment scandals that were taking place

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    Stillman Chap. 12: Public Budgeting.

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    Stillman Chap. 13: Implementation.

     Case 13: Jacobs, Marmor & Oberlander, "Paradox of Rationing: Oregon Health Plan."
    by Sierra Turner, 2005

    Throughout the past decade, Oregon’s pioneering model of prioritizing funding for health care through systematic ranking of services has drawn national and international attention.
    Oregon’s claim is its apparent willingness to confront head-on the hard choices, ethical dilemmas, and unavoidable trade-offs raised by the inflationary and technological pressures of modern medicine.
    In particular, the state sought to expand access to health insurance for uninsured Oregonians through unusual means. The price for expanded coverage was to be paid by rationing medical care services provided to the state’s low-income Medicaid population.
    The rationing of services ostensibly rested on a complex technical analysis, underpinned by the emergent tools of cost-benefit analysis, as well as on an elaborate process of public participation in policymaking decisions.
    However, from the beginning, the Oregon Health Plan (OHP) has ignited substantial controversy. What appeared as brave innovation to some analysts was viewed instead by others as dangerous and morally dubious experimentation.
    The case proceeds in three sections. First, we review the original debate over rationing in Oregon and summarize how the operation of the OHP has defied expectations. Next, we explore how the politics of rationing has unfolded in Oregon from enactment to implementation of the OHP. Finally, we consider the character of Oregon’s innovation
    and the lessons it holds more broadly for health care reform.
    During the 1980s, Medicaid spending increased dramatically and the program consumed a growing share of state budgets forcing many states to lower eligibility standards for Medicaid to an income level well below the federal poverty line (FPL) and cut coverage for optional enrollee categories, such as the medically needy.
    Oregon’s reformers promised an alternative to the practice of denying coverage to the insufficiently poor. Oregon proposed to extend Medicare coverage to all persons living below the poverty line, regardless of traditional eligibility categories. Their ultimate aim was universal coverage; the expansion of Medicaid was to be followed by an employer mandate to cover all of Oregon’s workers and their families.
    A Health Services Commission was given the job of compiling a list of clinical information from physicians, treatment cost, and benefit data, and community values from the public in order to reduce over 10,000 services that ranked 709 condition and treatment pairs. The Legislature’s decision on how much to fund Medicaid literally "drew a line" in this list, with beneficiaries provided all services above the line and denied all services below it.
    This denial of coverage to low ranked services for Medicaid recipients touched off a firestorm of protest from outside the state. External critics assailed the plan for singling out the poor and especially, women and children for rationing.
    Critics maintained that the OHP’s promise to ration care was not only unfair, but also unnecessary. Eliminating administrative waste, squeezing drug companies, and spending more represented, it was claimed, proven alternatives.
    The OHP has not funded expansion of Medicaid—as its initial rhetoric promised—by rationing services in order to generate savings. The process of setting priorities and drawing a "line," which attracted external attention, was never implemented as a formulaic mechanism for denying previously available care and cutting costs.
    In striking contrast to their initial claim that Medicaid expansion would be funded through "prioritization," OHP administrators estimate that the prioritized list has saved the state only 2% on total costs for the program over its first 5 years of operation.
    Not only has rationing failed to produce significant cuts in services, but the process of drawing up the "list" actually generated, in many respects, a more generous package of benefits than what Medicaid or even the private sector had offered prior to the OHP’s implementation: coverage for mental health, preventive, and dental services exceed the state average.
    The advocates of the OHP promised from the outset to expand access to Medicaid to all the poor; this was the payoff from what they preferred to call prioritization. The OHP has more than delivered. Oregon’s Medicaid program now covers all residents who are below the poverty line.
    In conclusion, the Oregon Health Plan that has operated since 1994 bears little resemblance to the program that was envisioned by both promoters and critics during the national debate over its adoption. In the end, what has been widely regarded outside of Oregon as innovative—a scientific approach to confronting the hard choices raised by health care rationing—has not been the significant innovation. And the real innovation in Oregon—the political strategy of using rationing rhetoric—has never been overlooked. The real foundation of the Oregon Health Plan is not science, but politics.

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    Stillman Chap. 14: Politics & Admin -- Issue Networks.
    Case #14- Laura Sims, “Reinventing School Lunch”
    By Ryan Murray, Spring 2009

    The National School Lunch Program is the largest and oldest of all child nutrition and food assistance programs.

    Policy Issues Advocacy Coalitions at Work Documenting the Need for Policy Changes
  • Another important organization in reforming the NSLP was the Public Voice for Food and Health Policy, which was founded by Ellen Haas in 1983.
  • The Public Voice organization fought to reduce the high-fat commodities, such as butter, cheese, eggs, and processed foods, that were present in school lunches.
  • Regulatory and Legislative Reform Efforts
  • Ellen Haas was eventually appointed to the Secretary of Agriculture Espy where she introduced the School Meals Initiative for Healthy Children.
  • This initiative was based on four strategies to improve the quality of school meals:

  • 1. Eating for health: using regulatory reform to ensure that schools meet quality standards in food as well as providing key nutrients and calories.
    2. Making food choices
    3. Maximizing Resources:  stressed the need to work more closely with federal partners such as the Dept. of Health and Human Services and the Department of Education.
    4. Managing for the future:  emphasized flexibility by using technology and reducing paperwork for the NSLP.
  • Haas also introduced a mandate that required all schools to meet a nutritional standard to make sure meals complied with the Dietary Guidelines.

    Overall, Haas is recognized as a “policy entrepreneur” who was instrumental in raising awareness of the media and the policy makers to the problems of the NSLP and her reform efforts to improve the quality of school lunches.

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    Stillman Chap. 15: Public Interest & De-Regulation.

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    Stillman Chap. 16: Ethics.

    Douglas F. Morgan, "Madonna's Sex "
    by  Amy Halpin & Anna Michelle Cox, 2001 (another below)

    Primary Objective:  Explore the institutional conditions (both organizational and professional)
    necessary to translate principles of right action into effective administration practice using the
    Madonna controversy of her book Sex.

    Sex:  A series of personal poses taken by a well-known photographer who erotically captures
    the pop star's sexual fantasies.

    Administrative Fantasies and Role Ambiguity
    The role of librarians in the Madonna controversy allows us to explore this linkage between
    stewardship principles and the mediating conditions for effective moral practice.

    There are at least three reasons why librarians and local public libraries are particularly useful in
    exploring the linkage between principles of "right thinking" and the conditions for "right action."
       1. Libraries, along with schools, reflect as well as shape the social construction of meaning
    within local construction of meaning within local communities.
       2.  Professional librarians participate in this process of "making social meaning" with the kind
    of formal professional training that does not differ in significant respects from that received by
    most public sector career administrators.
       3.  Both librarians and libraries are greatly influenced by the American Library Association's
    growing role in shaping the meaning of censorship controversies in cases like Madonna's Sex.

    The problem is that libraries do not have unlimited financial resources; books are paid for by
    community tax payers.  While libraries are expected to reflect the needs of its citizens, it is also
    necessary to protect the right of access to ideas for all users.

    In response to this controversy, different institutions responded in different ways.
        -not purchasing the book
        -removing it once purchased
        -vigorously defending purchase
        -alterations in policies (enabling parents more control over what their child reads)

    Madonna's Sex: Patterns of Administrative Response
    If libraries refused to buy the book, it would appear to be censorship, since there was surely
    patron demand; if they bought a lot of copies for circulation, however, these might be stolen or
    damaged.  Many libraries chose to buy just one or two copies to keep on reserve, but this often
    sparked as much opposition and criticism as if the library had purchased dozens of copies to
    satisfy demand.

    Libraries responded to this dilemma with three different patterns of administration:

        1. "Just Say No" or Emptio Interuptus
                -Not enough public support for the book to be ordered.
        2. Making Madonna's Sex Safe
                -One copy bought, that could not be checked out.
                -Due to the quality of the binding and inappropriateness of the material
        3. Unrestricted Access:  Madonna's Sex May be Had for the Price of a library card.
                -leave policies as they stood where anyone with a library card can check out any book

    Impact of ALA's Office of Intellectual Freedom
    ALA constantly reminded its members that their primary mission is to promote and defend
    intellectual freedom against all forms of censorship.

    Compared to most other public professions, this stewardship responsibility is well developed
    and reasonably well defined.

    The Library Bill of Rights includes, but is not limited to:
        -placing responsibility on parents for controlling access of material to minors
        -opposing labeling or expurgation of materials
        -preventing restrictions on access
        -protecting patron's rights of privacy

    Office of Intellectual Freedom
    Created in 1967, the OIF bears responsibility for educating libraries and the general public on
    the importance of intellectual freedom, using ALA policies as a guide.

    Through its various publications, model policies, and legal support, the Office of Intellectual
    Freedom has provided those exercising administrative discretion with a mediating institutional
    structure for defining the meaning of stewardship by linking library policy with constitutional

    Douglas F. Morgan, "Madonna’s Sex"
    by Jason Lewis (Fall, 2003)

    o The issue at hand is the importance of “right thinking” and “right action”.
    o  Is Madonna’s Sex, or any likewise material, an objectionable expression of what an artist may feel?
    o Whose role is it to determine what material should be available for public viewing, and who should be able to access such material?

    Administrative Fantasies and Role Ambiguity
    o Sue Miller’s moral dilemma is fertile ground for those concerned with the ethical basis of administrative discretion.
    o Even when a career administrator is confident about “the right thing to do”, frequently there is a large abyss between stewardship belief and institutional action.
    o Three reasons why librarians and local public libraries are particularly useful in exploring the linkage between principles of “right thinking” and the conditions for “right action” are the following:

    (1) Libraries reflect and shape the social construction of meaning within local communities.
    (2) Professional librarians participate in the process of “making social meaning” with similar professional training of other public sector administrators.
    (3) Librarians and libraries are influenced by the American Library Association’s (ALA) growing role in shaping the meaning of censorship controversies.
    o Library Bill of Rights, First Amendment- Books and other library resources should be provided for interest, information, and enlightenment of all people of the community the library serves. Materials should not be excluded because of origin, background, or views of those contributing to their action.

    Madonna’s Sex: Patterns of Administrative Response
    o First Pattern- “Just Say No” or Emptio Interuptus
    o Second Pattern - Making Madonna’s SexSafe
    o Third Pattern - Unrestricted Access: Madonna’s Sex May Be Had for the Price of a Library Card

    All three patterns of this section show incidents of how people of their particular community spoke their concerns on the issue of whether or not the book should be accessible.

    o There is a need to go beyond looking at what administrative practice is and also look at the aspects of moral action.

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