Huntingdon College: Political Science Program | Courses | What's New? | SPS |
PSC 306: Public Organizations
Fesler, James and Donald Kettl, Politics of the Administrative Process.
Student's WORKBOOK
By Dr. Jeremy Lewis
Revised 17 Jan 2005; click Reload or Refresh for latest version.
Chapters: 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14




CHAP. 2: WHAT GOVT DOES




1. What are the functions of government?
 
 
 
 
 

2. How are functions divided up in the US intergovernmental system?
 

VARIETY & SUCCESS:
 

GROWTH:
 

FEDERAL LEVEL
 

STATE:
 

LOCAL:

SPECIAL:
 

3. What TOOLS does US government use to deliver programs?
 

Grants
 

Contracts
 

Regulations
 

Tax expenditures
 

Loan programs
 

Proxy.



CHAP. 3: ORGANIZATION THEORY




1. Structure: why are organizations hierarchical?
 

Hierarchical authority models (Gulick and Weber)
 

SYSTEMS theory
 

3 CHALLENGES to hierarchical models:
 

Govt POWER
 

PUBLIC ADMIN
 
 
 

2. Systems: how can organizations be considered as dynamic systems?
 
 
 

Closed & open systems.
 
 
 

3. Humanist challenge: how can large bureaus be sensitive to the individual worker or client?
 

Sensitivity training.
 
 
 
 
 

4. Pluralism & organizational culture.
 
 
 
 
 

5. Third Party Administration.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

6. Conclusion.
 
 
 
 
 
 




CHAP. 4: ORGANIZATION THEORY: STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM. [new chapter, 2/e]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

REFORM IN AMERICA
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

CONFLICTING THEORIES
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

DOWNSIZING
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

REENGINEERING
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

ASSESSING THE REFORMS
 
Major Administrative Reforms in the US.
Downsizing Reengineering Continuous Improvement
Goal Lower Expenditures Efficiency responsiveness
Direction Outside-in Top-down Bottom-up
Method Blunt Targets Competition Cooperation
Central Focus Size Process Interpersonal relations.
Action Discontinuous Discontinuous Continuous

 
 
 

ALL THE WORLD'S A STAGE
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

THE STRATEGIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

THE TACTICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
 
 
 

Like Rubik's cube, downsizing has simple goal but
 

Reengineering is both procedural and analytical in tactics:
 

Performance management system is cutting edge:
 

Accrual budgeting common:
 

Customer-centered organizations,

co-location of services
 

CONCLUSION
 

Reformers have mixed methods ...
 

Reforms outside US ?
 

Real results in efficiency?
 

Does management matter?
 

Whence come central ideas of PA reform?


CHAP. 5: EXECUTIVE BRANCH
 

COMPONENTS: Bureaus, departments, independent regulatory agencies, govt corporations and field offices.
 
 
 

DIRECTION: EOP and White House Staff, OMB, NSC, Office of Policy Development.
 

Miles' Law,
 
 
 

1. How is the executive branch organized?
 

Bureaus
 

Variety
 

spending
 

Inner, Outer & modern depts
 
 
 
 
 

2. How does administration typically develop?
 

FOUR STAGES of administration, shared abroad:
 
 
 
 
 

3. To what degree should democratic processes intrude upon administration?
 
 
 
 
 

11 Indept Regulatory Commissions
 
 
 
 
 

4. Why have some functions been taken out of the political arena?
 
 
 
 
 

5. How centralized is the federal bureaucracy?
 

functional system
 

areal or prefectoral system:
 
 
 

6. What are the instruments of presidential control of administration?
 
 
 

Four reasons for ineffective presidential management:
 
 
 

Brownlow Committee led to 1939 Reorganization Act:
 
 
 

Swelling of Presidency.
 
 


CHAP. 6: ORGANIZATION PROBLEMS
 

Kaufman's 3 CORE VALUES:
 
 
 

Search for EFFECTIVENESS:
 
 
 

1. How can we find efficiency in a bureaucracy?
 

4 organizational PROBLEMS persist:
 
 
 

2. How can conflict between agencies be controlled democratically?
 

FUNCTION v AREA:
 
 
 
 
 

3. How can policy be coordinated where there are conflicting agency jurisdictions?
 

* interagency coordination
 

HORIZONTAL:
 

VERTICAL:
 

SUPERDEPTS:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

4. What is the role of experts versus general managers?
 

* role of support staff:
 
 
 
 
 

5. Does reorganization increase or decrease effectiveness? Can it substitute for policy changes?
 

More than rearranging building blocks: often POLITICIZED.
 

Since mid 1980s role of PRESIDENT
 

INS v Chadha
 

COMPREHENSIVE Reorganization:
 

OBSTACLES to reorganization: agency TURF and
 

congressional COMMITTEE jurisdictions.
 

CONCLUSION: structure is product of dynamics which are political.



CHAP. 7: CIVIL SERVICE

managing, classifying, staffing & promotion, pay, unions, privacy and political activity.
 

1. What is the pattern of public employment in the US?
 
 
 
 
 

2. How should individuals be classified into job categories?
 
 
 
 
 

3. How is the system managed?
 

1883-1978 Civil Service Commission.
 
 
 

1978 Civil Service Reform Act abolished, set up:
 
 
 

TOO COMPLEX: 3x personnel officers
 
 
 

ATTACKS on merit system:
 
 
 

1989 Volcker Commission
 
 
 

GRADE INFLATION:
 

REFORM? Collapse grades
 
 
 
 
 

4. What should be the method of staff hiring?
 
 
 

Exams
 
 
 

Ranks
 
 
 

5. To what degree should social origin affect hiring & promotion?
 
 
 
 
 

6. What has been the impact of affirmative action on hiring and promotion?
 

PATTERN:
 

PACE: Professional & Administrative Career Exam 1974-82.

OPM exams:
 

Late 1980s: DECENTRALIZATION
 
 
 

1990 NEW SYSTEM, ACWA:
 
 
 
 
 

7. How can people of talent enter the civil service?
 

TALENTED ENTRY:
 
 
 

PROMOTION:
 
 
 

SEPARATION:
 
 
 

RIFs (Reduction in Force)
 
 
 
 
 

8. How should public pay be compared?
 

COMPARABLE WORTH:
 
 
 
 
 

EMPLOYEE RIGHTS:
 
 
 
 
 

9. Should unions bargain in a public service?
 
 
 
 
 

10. Do civil servants have legitimate expectations of privacy on the public payroll?
 

1986 E.O.permitted
 
 
 

1989 Supreme Court,
 
 
 

1987 Foreign Service
 
 
 

11. Should civil servants be allowed to campaign for politicians?
 

Unions now call for end to 1939 Carl HATCH ACT

1976 Elrod v Burns Supreme Court
 
 
 

1980 Branti v Finkel,
 
 
 

1990 Rutan v Republican Party of Illinois:
 
 



CHAP. 8: HIGHER PUBLIC SERVICE

representativeness and elites; outsiders and insiders; career versus political officials; Senior Executive Service; pay.
 

1. To what extent is the bureaucracy a microcosm of society?

ELITIST?
 
 
 
 
 

2. Is the higher bureaucracy actually more representative than those abroad?
 
 
 
 
 

3. What proportion of the civil service should be dominated by political appointees?
 

POLITICAL LAYER: 120 in UK, 100-150 in France, 40 in Germany. 3,000 US!

Campaign staff often POORLY
 

CAB SECS usually BEST
 
 
 

APPOINTEES LEAVE
 
 
 

LAME DUCK YEAR:
 
 
 

SENATORIAL PRIVILEGE & HOLDS:
 
 
 

4. Should top servants be removable?
 
 
 

REASSIGNMENTS:
 
 
 

BONUSES for SES:
 
 
 

EXEC DEVELOPMENT:
 
 
 

DISSATISFACTION IN SES
 

5. Should the top executives be paid like those of private corporations?
 

1967-89 Fed Salary Act:
 
 
 

1989: Citizen's Commission
 
 
 

Volcker Commission: SEPARATE
 
 
 

6. Is it more professional than those abroad with which it must deal?
 
 



CHAP. 9: DECISION MAKING

Need for information and trading off values; rationalism and PPBS; bargaining and the cuban missile crisis; citizen participation; public choice; problems of uncertainty.
 
 
 
 
 

1. Are there any ways in which better policy could be secured by improved method of decisionmaking?
 

H.Simon:
 

Theories have DESCRIPTIVE & NORMATIVE CONTENT.
 
 
 

PROBLEMS:
 

Information
 

Political Values.
 

2. Does bargaining in a political market prevent the careful, rational scrutiny of policy alternatives?
 

RATIONAL:
 
 
 

SHIFTED decisionmaking to PPBers
 
 
 

LINDBLOM
 
 
 

MARCH & SIMON:
 
 
 
 
 

3. Did careful policymaking prevent nuclear war in the Cuban missile crisis, or did something else determine the outcome?
 
 
 

BARGAINING:
 
 
 

CRITICS:
 
 
 
 
 

4. Is ``maximum feasible participation'' bound to lead to ``maximum feasible misunderstanding'' [as Pat Moynihan phrased it.]
 
 
 

PARTICIPATION:
 

PROFESSIONAL
 

NOT NEW
 

INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEES
 

Adam Smith:
 

Usually very LOW TURNOUT
 

Does provide much greater INFORMATION FLOW.
 

CRITICS:
 

Carter CUT
 

[FACA requires openness].
 

5. To what extent is it possible to make public policy reflect the aggregate choice of the public?
 

PUBLIC CHOICE:
 

(Stuart Butler: PRIVATIZATION
 

BENEFITS:
 

CRITICS:
 
 
 

6. How can politicians deal with making choices amid great uncertainty and lack of information?
 

LIMITS TO DECISIONMAKING:
 

TECH INFO can be WRONG:
 

INFO PATHOLOGIES:
 

SOLUTIONS?
 

CRISIS:
 

Each is used in its own sphere:
 
 
 
 



CHAP. 10: BUDGETING

Effect on the economy; top-down and bottom-up budgeting; incrementalism and uncontrollables; the appropriations process and incrementalism; Gramm-Rudman-Hollings; back door tactics; impoundment.
 
 
 
 
 

1. Has the federal government truly lost control of its own spending?
 

Decisions are both FINANCIAL (economic) and RESOURCE based (political).
 

ECONOMIC ROLE:
 
 
 

DIFFICULTY
 

[Stagflation]: 1970s inflation and unemployment increased together.
 
 
 

FED RESERVE
 

REAGAN SUPPLY SIDE THEORY:
 

DEFICITS
 

ECONOMY
 

ROSY SCENARIO of Stockman,
 

CONSTN set up conflict
 

1921 BUDGET ACT
 

REAGAN OMB
 

GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS LIMITS
 

TOP-DOWN:
 

BOTTOM UP:
 

REFORMS OF incrementalism: (PANACEAS)
 

PPBS;
 

Nixon's ``Management by Objectives''
 

Carter's ZBB
 

Bush FLEXIBLE FREEZE
 

RISE OF UNCONTROLLABLES:
 

APPROPRIATION:
 

Law of ANTICIPATED REACTIONS:
 

Congressional budget decisions:
 
 
 

2. How much progress has budgetary reform made, and how could it defeat special interest competition?
 
 
 

1974 Budget Act:
 

CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS
 
 
 

GRAMM-RUDMAN-HOLLINGS Act 1985
 
 
 

3. Is there something inherent in the democratic nature of the congress which prevents it balancing the budget?
 

REFORM?
 

All of these are procedural fixes for substantive problems.
 

4. Why should so much of the budget be ``off budget'' and separated from oversight?
 

BACK DOOR TACTICS INCREASE SPENDING:
 

BUDGET CONTROLS ON EXECUTION:
 
 
 

5. Should a President be able to impound funds which have been irresponsibly appropriated?
 

IMPOUNDMENT: 1974
 

MANAGEMENT CONTROL
 
 
 
 
 



CHAP. 11: IMPLEMENTATION

Evaluating programs; uncertainty, disorganization, lack of resources; intergovernmental relations; implementation problems; off-budget and contracting out; feedback.
 

IMPLEM =
 

1. How can we fairly evaluate programs where there is no equivalent of ``currency'' as a measure?
 

Pressman & Wildavsky: SEAMLESS WEB
 

Moynihan:
 

Cong compromises tend to produce CONTRADICTORY GOALS,
 
 
 

Goals can CHANGE over time.
 
 
 

Legis INTENT is poor benchmark.
 
 
 

EFFICIENCY standard:
 
 
 

RESPONSIVENESS standard:
 
 
 

2. What are the problems of performance?
 

UNCERTAINTY:
 
 
 

RESOURCES
 
 
 

ORGANIZATIONAL features
 
 
 

LEADERSHIP
 
 
 

3. How is the US system set up to ensure complex implementation problems?
 

INTERDEPENDENCE
 

RR: CONSOLIDATED
 

CATEGORICAL grants:
 
 
 

BLOCK grants:
 
 
 

FORMULA distrib
 
 
 

PROJECT distrib.
 
 
 

REGULATION:
 
 
 

PARTIAL PRE-EMPTION:
 

4. How far can federal officials control their own programs?
 

IMPLEM PROBLEMS:
 
 
 

CONTRACTING:
 
 
 

PROBLEMS:
 
 
 

FORMAL EVAL
 
 
 

BACKWARD MAPPING (R.Elmore):
 
 
 
 
 



CHAP. 12: LEGISLATIVE CONTROL of ADMINISTRATION

Paradox of oversight; varieties of committee; barriers to information; confidentiality; GAO and Chadha.
 

PARADOX OF OVERSIGHT:

PURPOSES of oversight:
 

1. How do committees vary in their subcultures and modus operandi?

SENATE:
 

HR:
 

Growth of PERM authn programs
 

Ctees on GOVT OPS
 
 
 

2. Is information just a tool, or a commodity in a market exchange?
 
 
 

BARRIERS:
 
 
 

3. Is official information to be owned by bureaus, congress, or the public at large?
 

SECRECY & classification system
 
 
 

TOWER REPORT
 
 
 

CLASSIFIED INFO
 
 
 

4. How does congressional investigation square with executive privilege?

EXEC PRIVILEGE esp during Watergate.
 
 
 

STAFF Support
 
 
 

CASEWORK
 
 
 
 
 

5. Should the congress keep its ``legislative veto'' over the implementation and regulation of certain acts?
 

LEGIS VETO: four forms
 
 
 
 
 

6. How has the Supreme Court tried to answer this question?
 
 



CHAP. 13: REGULATION and the COURTS.

types of regulations and statutory mandates; rulemaking and adjudication procedures, and judicial review; class-action suits and torts liability.
 

TWO OBJECTIVES of govt regulation:
 

Three features are central to both:
 
 
 

One of OLDEST
 
 
 

David Vogel:
 
 
 

1. What is the difference between Economic and Social regulation?
 

EXTERNALITIES
 

2. What are the types and methods of regulation.?
 
 
 

JURISDICTIONS:
 
 
 

STATES:
 
 
 

Statutory mandates
 

EXPERTNESS:
 
 
 

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

RISK ASSESSMENT.
 
 
 

3. How is regulation required to proceed?
 

REGULATORY PROCEDURE:
 

1946 Admin Procedures Act;
 

JUDICIAL review:
 

AGENCY RECORDS
 

ADMIN ADJUDICATION:
 

4. Do bureaus have wide discretion, or are they hemmed in by courts?
 
 
 

COURTS' REGULATION OF REGULATORS.
 
 
 
 
 

5. How do class action suits fit in with individual justice?
 

CLASS ACTION SUITS:
 
 
 

PRIVATE A-Gs
 

6. Who should pay when government does damage to an individual?
 

TORT LIABILITY:
 
 
 

1970s Sup Ct
 
 
 

1988 Sup Ct
 
 
 

cong passed law
 
 
 

COSTS OF LITIGATION:
 
 
 

1980 Equal Access to Justice Act:
 
 
 

7. How do the values of the judicial and administrative systems conflict?
 

SYSTEMS & VALUES: JUDICIAL & ADMIN.
 

SCALE:
 

8. Should regulations be reviewed centrally by political appointees?
 

REVIEW OF REGS:
 
 
 

REAGAN ADMIN
 
 
 
 



CHAP. 14: CONCLUSION: Bureaucratic Accountability & Ethics.

Control systems & objectives; screening and monitoring; the revolving door.

first govt corruption:
 
 
 

1. How can bureaus be rendered accountable in a democracy?
 

THEORIES:
 
 
 

CONTROL SYSTEMS are usually NEGATIVE:
 

Four elements:
 

INTERNAL control
 

US system relies on
 

Control objectives:
 
 
 

2. What should be the ethical standards of a bureaucracy?
 

Cal Mackenzie:
 

1978 Ethics in Govt Act
 

1988 Ethics bill
 

1989 Ethics Reform Act
 

FBI INVESTIGATION
 
 
 

POST GOVT ACTIVITIES.
 

NEVER:
 
 
 

2 years:
 
 
 

1 year:
 

1 Year:
 

Act 1988
 

3. What will make the public service attractive?