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PSC 314: Political theory and Constitutional Law.
Supreme Court Opinions:
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
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U.S. Supreme Court
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
BROWN ET AL. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS. * No. 1.
Argued December 9, 1952. Reargued December 8, 1953.
Decided May 17, 1954.

Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a State solely on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws
permitting or requiring such segregation, denies to Negro children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment - even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors of white and Negro schools may be equal. Pp.
486-496.

     (a) The history of the Fourteenth Amendment is inconclusive as to its intended effect on public education. Pp. 489-490.

     (b) The question presented in these cases must be determined, not on the basis of conditions existing when the Fourteenth
     Amendment was adopted, but in the light of the full development of public education and its present place in American life
     throughout the Nation. Pp. 492-493.

     (c) Where a State has undertaken to provide an opportunity for an education in its public schools, such an opportunity is a
     right which must be made available to all on equal terms. P. 493.

     (d) Segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprives children of the minority group of equal
     educational opportunities, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal. Pp. 493-494.

     (e) The "separate but equal" doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 , has no place in the field of public
     education. P. 495. [347 U.S. 483, 484]

     (f) The cases are restored to the docket for further argument on specified questions relating to the forms of the decrees. Pp.
     495-496.

[ Footnote * ] Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of South Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County School
Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, argued December 10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; and No. 10, Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al., on certiorari to
the Supreme Court of Delaware, argued December 11, 1952, reargued December 9, 1953.

Robert L. Carter argued the cause for appellants in No. 1 on the original argument and on the reargument. Thurgood Marshall
argued the cause for appellants in No. 2 on the original argument and Spottswood W. Robinson, III, for appellants in No. 4 on the
original argument, and both argued the causes for appellants in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. Louis L. Redding and Jack
Greenberg argued the cause for respondents in No. 10 on the original argument and Jack Greenberg and Thurgood Marshall on
the reargument.

On the briefs were Robert L. Carter, Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Louis L. Redding, Jack Greenberg,
George E. C. Hayes, William R. Ming, Jr., Constance Baker Motley, James M. Nabrit, Jr., Charles S. Scott, Frank D. Reeves,
Harold R. Boulware and Oliver W. Hill for appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and respondents in No. 10; George M. Johnson for
appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4; and Loren Miller for appellants in Nos. 2 and 4. Arthur D. Shores and A. T. Walden were on the
Statement as to Jurisdiction and a brief opposing a Motion to Dismiss or Affirm in No. 2.

Paul E. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General of Kansas, argued the cause for appellees in No. 1 on the original argument and on the
reargument. With him on the briefs was Harold R. Fatzer, Attorney General.

John W. Davis argued the cause for appellees in No. 2 on the original argument and for appellees in Nos. 2 and 4 on the
reargument. With him on the briefs in No. 2 were T. C. Callison, Attorney General of South Carolina, Robert McC. Figg, Jr., S.
E. Rogers, William R. Meagher and Taggart Whipple. [347 U.S. 483, 485]

J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General of Virginia, and T. Justin Moore argued the cause for appellees in No. 4 on the original
argument and for appellees in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. On the briefs in No. 4 were J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney
General, and Henry T. Wickham, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Virginia, and T. Justin Moore, Archibald G.
Robertson, John W. Riely and T. Justin Moore, Jr. for the Prince Edward County School Authorities, appellees.

H. Albert Young, Attorney General of Delaware, argued the cause for petitioners in No. 10 on the original argument and on the
reargument. With him on the briefs was Louis J. Finger, Special Deputy Attorney General.

By special leave of Court, Assistant Attorney General Rankin argued the cause for the United States on the reargument, as amicus
curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and affirmance in No. 10. With him on the brief were Attorney General Brownell, Philip
Elman, Leon Ulman, William J. Lamont and M. Magdelena Schoch. James P. McGranery, then Attorney General, and Philip
Elman filed a brief for the United States on the original argument, as amicus curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and
affirmance in No. 10.

Briefs of amici curiae supporting appellants in No. 1 were filed by Shad Polier, Will Maslow and Joseph B. Robison for the
American Jewish Congress; by Edwin J. Lukas, Arnold Forster, Arthur Garfield Hays, Frank E. Karelsen, Leonard Haas, Saburo
Kido and Theodore Leskes for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by John Ligtenberg and Selma M. Borchardt for the
American Federation of Teachers. Briefs of amici curiae supporting appellants in No. 1 and respondents in No. 10 were filed by
Arthur J. Goldberg and Thomas E. Harris [347 U.S. 483, 486]   for the Congress of Industrial Organizations and by Phineas Indritz for
the American Veterans Committee, Inc.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on different facts
and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their consideration together in this consolidated opinion. 1   [347
U.S. 483, 487]

In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission
to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each instance, [347 U.S. 483, 488]   they had been denied
admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation
was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases
other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called "separate but equal"
doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 . Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded
when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the
Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of
their superiority to the Negro schools.

The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not "equal" and cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are deprived
of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction. 2
Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court. 3
[347 U.S. 483, 489]

Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered
exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices in racial segregation,
and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that,
although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are
inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions
among "all persons born or naturalized in the United States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter
and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state
legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.

An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's history, with respect to segregated schools, is the status of
public education at that time. 4 In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported [347 U.S. 483, 490]   by general
taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was
almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some
states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences as well as in the business and
professional world. It is true that public school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the North, but the
effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions
of public education did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were
common in rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states; and compulsory school attendance was
virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment
relating to its intended effect on public education.

In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as
proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. 5 The doctrine of [347 U.S. 483, 491]   "separate but equal" did
not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but
transportation. 6 American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have been six
cases involving the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field of public education. 7 In Cumming v. County Board of Education, 175
U.S. 528 , and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 , the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. 8 In more recent cases, all
on the graduate school [347 U.S. 483, 492]   level, inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied
to Negro students of the same educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 ; Sipuel v. Oklahoma,
332 U.S. 631 ; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 ; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 . In none of these cases
was it necessary to re-examine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court
expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.

In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro and
white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries
of teachers, and other "tangible" factors. 9 Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in
the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public
education.

In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when
Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in
American life throughout [347 U.S. 483, 493]   the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools
deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.

Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.

We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the
physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational
opportunities? We believe that it does.

In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational
opportunities, this Court relied in large part on "those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for
greatness in a law school." In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white
graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: ". . . his ability to study, to engage in
discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession." [347 U.S. 483, 494]   Such considerations
apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the
Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:

     "Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is
     greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
     inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of
     law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of
     some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system." 10

Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported
by modern authority. 11 Any language [347 U.S. 483, 495]   in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.

We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought
are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 12

Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local
conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the
consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question - the constitutionality of segregation in
public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we
may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are
requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term. 13
The Attorney General [347 U.S. 483, 496]   of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states
requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by
September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954. 14

     It is so ordered.

Footnotes

[ Footnote 1 ] In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education, the plaintiffs are Negro children of elementary school age
residing in Topeka. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas to enjoin enforcement of
a Kansas statute which permits, but does not require, cities of more than 15,000 population to maintain separate school facilities
for Negro and white students. Kan. Gen. Stat. 72-1724 (1949). Pursuant to that authority, the Topeka Board of Education
elected to establish segregated elementary schools. Other public schools in the community, however, are operated on a
nonsegregated basis. The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. 2281 and 2284, found that segregation in public
education has a detrimental effect upon Negro children, but denied relief on the ground that the Negro and white schools were
substantially equal with respect to buildings, transportation, curricula, and educational qualifications of teachers. 98 F. Supp. 797.
The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1253. In the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, the plaintiffs are Negro
children of both elementary and high school age residing in Clarendon County. They brought this action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code
which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. S. C. Const., Art. XI, 7; S. C. Code 5377 (1942). The
three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. 2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief. The court found that the Negro
schools were inferior to the white schools and ordered the defendants to begin immediately to equalize the facilities. But the court
sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission [347 U.S. 483, 487]   to the white schools during
the equalization program. 98 F. Supp. 529. This Court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for the
purpose of obtaining the court's views on a report filed by the defendants concerning the progress made in the equalization
program. 342 U.S. 350 . On remand, the District Court found that substantial equality had been achieved except for buildings and
that the defendants were proceeding to rectify this inequality as well. 103 F. Supp. 920. The case is again here on direct appeal
under 28 U.S.C. 1253. In the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, the plaintiffs are Negro children of high school age
residing in Prince Edward county. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to
enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in
public schools. Va. Const., 140; Va. Code 22-221 (1950). The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. 2281 and
2284, denied the requested relief. The court found the Negro school inferior in physical plant, curricula, and transportation, and
ordered the defendants forthwith to provide substantially equal curricula and transportation and to "proceed with all reasonable
diligence and dispatch to remove" the inequality in physical plant. But, as in the South Carolina case, the court sustained the validity
of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the equalization program. 103 F. Supp.
337. The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1253. In the Delaware case, Gebhart v. Belton, the plaintiffs are Negro
children of both elementary and high school age residing in New Castle County. They brought this action in the Delaware Court of
Chancery to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes
and whites in public schools. Del. Const., Art. X, 2; Del. Rev. Code 2631 (1935). The Chancellor gave judgment for the plaintiffs
and ordered their immediate admission to schools previously attended only by white children, on the ground that the Negro schools
were inferior with respect to teacher training, pupil-teacher ratio, extracurricular activities, physical plant, and time and distance
involved [347 U.S. 483, 488]   in travel. 87 A. 2d 862. The Chancellor also found that segregation itself results in an inferior education
for Negro children (see note 10, infra), but did not rest his decision on that ground. Id., at 865. The Chancellor's decree was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, which intimated, however, that the defendants might be able to obtain a modification
of the decree after equalization of the Negro and white schools had been accomplished. 91 A. 2d 137, 152. The defendants,
contending only that the Delaware courts had erred in ordering the immediate admission of the Negro plaintiffs to the white
schools, applied to this Court for certiorari. The writ was granted, 344 U.S. 891 . The plaintiffs, who were successful below, did
not submit a cross-petition.

[ Footnote 2 ] 344 U.S. 1, 141 , 891.

[ Footnote 3 ] 345 U.S. 972 . The Attorney General of the United States participated both Terms as amicus curiae.

[ Footnote 4 ] For a general study of the development of public education prior to the Amendment, see Butts and Cremin, A
History of Education in American Culture (1953), Pts. I, II; Cubberley, Public Education in the United States (1934 ed.), cc.
II-XII. School practices current at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment are described in Butts and Cremin,
supra, at 269-275; Cubberley, supra, at 288-339, 408-431; Knight, Public Education in the South (1922), cc. VIII, IX. See also
H. Ex. Doc. No. 315, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1871). Although the demand for free public schools followed substantially the same
pattern in both the North and the South, the development in the South did not begin to gain momentum until about 1850, some
twenty years after that in the North. The reasons for the somewhat slower development in the South (e. g., the rural character of
the South and the different regional attitudes toward state assistance) are well explained in Cubberley, supra, at 408-423. In the
country as a whole, but particularly in the South, the War [347 U.S. 483, 490]   virtually stopped all progress in public education. Id., at
427-428. The low status of Negro education in all sections of the country, both before and immediately after the War, is described
in Beale, A History of Freedom of Teaching in American Schools (1941), 112-132, 175-195. Compulsory school attendance
laws were not generally adopted until after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it was not until 1918 that such laws
were in force in all the states. Cubberley, supra, at 563-565.

[ Footnote 5 ] Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 67-72 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 -308 (1880):
"It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. What is this but [347 U.S. 483, 491]   declaring that the law in the States shall be
the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States,
and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be
made against them by law because of their color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a
necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race, - the right to exemption from unfriendly
legislation against them distinctively as colored, - exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening
the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the
condition of a subject race." See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344 -345
(1880).

[ Footnote 6 ] The doctrine apparently originated in Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 206 (1850), upholding school
segregation against attack as being violative of a state constitutional guarantee of equality. Segregation in Boston public schools
was eliminated in 1855. Mass. Acts 1855, c. 256. But elsewhere in the North segregation in public education has persisted in
some communities until recent years. It is apparent that such segregation has long been a nationwide problem, not merely one of
sectional concern.

[ Footnote 7 ] See also Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).

[ Footnote 8 ] In the Cumming case, Negro taxpayers sought an injunction requiring the defendant school board to discontinue the
operation of a high school for white children until the board resumed operation of a high school for Negro children. Similarly, in the
Gong Lum case, the plaintiff, a child of Chinese descent, contended only that state authorities had misapplied the doctrine by
classifying him with Negro children and requiring him to attend a Negro school.

[ Footnote 9 ] In the Kansas case, the court below found substantial equality as to all such factors. 98 F. Supp. 797, 798. In the
South Carolina case, the court below found that the defendants were proceeding "promptly and in good faith to comply with the
court's decree." 103 F. Supp. 920, 921. In the Virginia case, the court below noted that the equalization program was already
"afoot and progressing" (103 F. Supp. 337, 341); since then, we have been advised, in the Virginia Attorney General's brief on
reargument, that the program has now been completed. In the Delaware case, the court below similarly noted that the state's
equalization program was well under way. 91 A. 2d 137, 149.

[ Footnote 10 ] A similar finding was made in the Delaware case: "I conclude from the testimony that in our Delaware society,
State-imposed segregation in education itself results in the Negro children, as a class, receiving educational opportunities which are
substantially inferior to those available to white children otherwise similarly situated." 87 A. 2d 862, 865.

[ Footnote 11 ] K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (Midcentury White House
Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein,
The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What
are the Psychological Effects of [347 U.S. 483, 495]   Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion and Attitude
Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (MacIver, ed., (1949), 44-48; Frazier, The
Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. And see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).

[ Footnote 12 ] See Bolling v. Sharpe, post, p. 497, concerning the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

[ Footnote 13 ] "4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment "(a) would a
decree necessarily follow providing that, within the [347 U.S. 483, 496]   limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro
children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or "(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit
an effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based on color distinctions?
"5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) and (b) are based, and assuming further that this Court will exercise its equity
powers to the end described in question 4 (b), "(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases; "(b) if so, what
specific issues should the decrees reach; "(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to
recommending specific terms for such decrees; "(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to frame
decrees in these cases, and if so what general directions should the decrees of this Court include and what procedures should the
courts of first instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decrees?"

[ Footnote 14 ] See Rule 42, Revised Rules of this Court (effective July 1, 1954). [347 U.S. 483, 497]

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