CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR TH E DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT.
No.8. Argued December 10-11, 1952.—Reargued December 8-9, 1953.—Decided May 17, 1954.
347 U.S. 497
MR.CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case challenges the validity of segregation in the public schools
of the District of Columbia. The
petitioners, minors of the Negro race, allege that such segregation
deprives them of due process of law
under the Fifth Amendment. They were refused admission to a public
school attended by white children
solely because of their race. They sought the aid of the District Court
for the District of Columbia in
obtaining admission. That court dismissed their complaint. The Court granted
a writ of certiorari before
judgement in the Court of Appeals because of the importance of the constitutional
question presented.
344 U.S. 873.
We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment Prohibits the
states from maintaining racially segregated public schools.1 The legal
problem in the District of
Columbia is somewhat different however. The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable
in the District of
Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth
Amendment which
applies only to the estates But the concepts of equal protection and due
process, both stemming from
our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal
protection of the laws" is a more
explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process of law, "
and , therefore, we do not imply
that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has
recognized, discrimination
may be so unjustifiable as to violative of due process. 2
Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular
care, since they are contrary
to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect. 3 As long ago as
1896, this Court declared the
principle "that the Constitution of the United States, in its present form,
forbids, so far as civil and
political rights are concerned, discrimination by the General Government,
or by the States, against any
citizen because of his race." 4 And in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60,
the Court held that a statute
which limited the right of a property owner to convey his property to a
person of another race was, as
an unreasonable discrimination, a denial of due process of law.
Although the Court has not assumed to define "liberty" with any great precision,
that term is not
confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends
to the full range of conduct
which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except
for a proper governmental
objective. Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to
any proper governmental
objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia
a burden that constitutes
an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process
Clause.
In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from
maintaining racially segregated
public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would
impose a lesser duty on the
Federal Government. 5 We hold that racial segregation in the public schools
of the District of Columbia
is a denial f the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution.
For the reasons set out in Brown v. Board of Education, this case will
be restored to the docket for
reargument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court. 345
U.S. 972.
It is so ordered.
1 Brown v Board of Education, ante, p. 483.
2 Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S.
1, 13-14; Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 595.
3 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216; Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100.
4 Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591. Cf. Steele v. Louisville and
Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S.
192, 198-199.
5 Cf. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24.