Brief Presentation at SAASS, July 9, 2003:
"Strategy versus Politics, Technology versus
Expertise:
on the Twenty-first anniversary of the Battle
of the Falklands /Malvinas, May-June 1982."
Revised 8 July 2003. By Jeremy
Lewis
Associate Professor of Political
Science, with tenure, Huntingdon
College.
"Any civilian who attempts to write a military history
is of necessity guilty of an act of presumption." -- Sir John Fortescue,
History
of the British Army.
Hypotheses:
short term political miscalculation, not grand
strategy, caused battle
developing country met developed country on roughly
equal technological terms
Argentina, 1982: pop. 30 m, income $7,000 per capita.
UK, 1982: pop 60 m, income $21,000 per capita.
differences of expertise, not technology, caused
success in ground war
internal repression function of armies interferes
with combat function
missiles demonstrated effectiveness on both sides
mobile, light weapons effective in power projection
outcomes indicated consequences of political conflict
without economics
Strategy versus Politics -- on both sides
conflicting claims to sovereignty
United Kingdom's historical limited investiture,
plantation, and support
UK's modern doubts about retention, development,
cost of communications
Argentina's constitutional claim to Malvinas
Questionable strategic value of islands to either
side
UK political concerns:
Conservative government's military budget cuts without
reducing commitments
decolonizing Falklands and Belize in conflict with
self-determination
implications for Gibraltar, N. Ireland (if not
Hong Kong)
remoteness of Falklands and South Georgias
hostage to stubborn conservatism of small colonial
population
impending reduction of naval forces, especially capital
ships and air power
impending withdrawal of exploration ship, HMS
Endurance
lack of progress on decolonizing Falklands, 1970s
Argentina's political concerns:
Peronist revival in government, ardent nationalism
changed leadership of junta
domestic political dissent, riots
economic recession, inflation
popular reactions to decade of repression (of
Tupamaros,
desapparecidos)
Falklands population's concerns:
maintenance of colonial status, stubborn resistance
to change
lack of economic development
dependence on communications via mainland Argentina
attrition of females of child-bearing age owing to
small garrison
Argentine result:
misled by British signals of unwillingness to defend
Malvinas
poor timing of the Argentine invasion, before UK
capability reduced
incomplete political and military planning
mitigated by diversion of forces from current exercise
British results
hasty departure of HM fleet, improvised planning
of supplies & logistics
amphibious ships hastily returned to active duty
only one UK amphibious brigade improvised successfully
minimal intelligence available until scouting accomplished
second infantry brigade cannibalized, unready till
final battle
diplomatic scramble to win favor of UN, US.
strategy of attacking center of gravity (Port
Stanley) was in tension with need for incremental victories (at
South Georgias, Goose Green, Pebble Island.)
Differentials in diplomacy
by invading, Argentina lost anticolonial advantage
in latin America
(Peru, Chile)
Argentina overestimated US support (Amb. Kirkpatrick
at UN)
UK successful with US (Sec. State Al. Haig)
UK successful at UN (Sir Anthony Parsons)
Latin American leadership of UN (Peru's Perez
de Cuellar) neutralized (by Haig /Cuellar plan.)
Differentials in public information
Argentina's over optimistic propaganda soon disproven,
intensified political failure
UK control in theatre over reporters' communications,
factual statements
UK failures in London in leaking operational security
material
(Goose Green)
Similar, moderate levels of technology
best examples: (Type 22 & 42 ships, exocet
missiles, helicopters, MGs)
some small advantages for developing country: (PNGs,
helicopters, foul weather clothing)
naval power
corvettes, frigates (type 21 and 22) and destroyers
(type
42)
light attack helicopters
diesel submarines (UK nuclear subs the major exception)
capital ships
rotary aircraft
medium and heavy lift (Puma, Sea King, Chinook)
light lift & attack (Gazelle, Scout, Lynx)
fixed wing aircraft
fighters /bombers /ground attack (Harrier, Skyhawk,
Mirage, Pucará)
long range bombing capability (Vulcan, C-130)
transport (C-130)
logistics
distances neutralized British advantage of naval
forces
naval and aerial refueling made possible British
power projection; but Argentine fighters unable to dogfight
resupply (RAS) in difficult seas essential for
British power projection
repair (Stena Seaspread) by commercial salvage
saved some British ships
STUFT requisitions proved their value for British
cost effective transport
weaponry
guided missiles:
AIM (AIM 9L sidewinder)
SAM (Sea Cat, Sea Dart, Sea Wolf, Rapier, Roland)
AS (Exocet, AS-12, Sea Skua)
ground: Milan
small arms: (Stirling /PAM, SLR /FN, Bren LMG
/Mag, GPMG.)
light tracked vehicles (Volvo Snowcat, Scimitar
& Scorpion)
major exception: UK nuclear attack submarine
HMS Conqueror sank cruiser Belgrano.
Differentials in Expertise
closest to equality in Argentine air forces and 5th
marines
great in naval forces: Argentine capital ships
and submarines had no successes
both armies experienced in internal law and order
functions
Argentine army primarily conscripted, poorly led,
trained and fed (Kon, 1982)
Argentine defense static, lacking patrolling
UK army trained for scouting, long range patrolling,
night attack
UK maintenance of aircraft in poor environment successful
Operational and Tactical Innovation
Argentina
air forces adjusted strike tactics daily, threw entire
front line stregth against British beachhead.
air forces used new Exocet /Super Etendard weapons
system
(air forces attempted in-flight refuelling?)
air forces adopted lear jets to fill gap in navigation
capability
navy used corvettes for scouting, special forces
in invasion
but army failed to counter attack over land after
British landing
but army failed to turn night vision capability into
night attacks
but army failed to defend mount Kent
but army, amid sheep pasture, failed properly to
feed conscripts
but navy failed to use capital ships, submarine attacks
United Kingdom
adaptation was required by rapid deployment, reorganization
of forces
extensive use of special forces (scouting, raids,
observation)
STUFT requisitioned ships, selected for south
Atlantic (no Ro-Ro ferries)
adjusted fleet tactics rapidly after attacks (chaff,
AAA, damage control systems)
attacked Argentine cruiser flotilla outside TEZ to
hasten battle
adjusted positions of fleet according to operational
needs
made main amphibious landing in sheltered sound,
sacrificing ability of radar for air defense
coordinated naval gunnery, as well as ground attack
aircraft, with infantry
used new weaponry with minimal training (Sea
Skua, AIM 9L, PNGs)
adapted anti-tank Milan (& 66, and 84mm) rockets
to anti-infantry trench use.
adjusted tactics to respond to loss of helo-lift
(Snow
cats, landing ships)
long range bombing with daisy-chained tankers, improvised
refuelling
longest bombing run (14,000 miles) to that date, though
missed runway
mistakenly sent paratroops to Darwin and Goose
Green with inadequate artillery support
mistakenly transferred Welsh guards by sea to
Bluff Cove in daylight without senior amphibious-trained commander or adequate
defense.
Outcomes
250 UK, 1200 Argentine losses, mostly of ground troops
(cf
Falklands population of 1,800)
removed front line fighter-bomber strength of Argentine
air forces
one Argentine cruiser and several smaller ships sank,
one submarine beached
two British destroyers, several frigates, one container
ship and heavy lift helicopters sunk.
replacement of junta with democratic regime
fortress Falklands, still heavily dependent on communications
re-election of Conservatives in UK, 1983, with historic
majority, cabinet shift to right
reduction of UK forces, naval in particular, continued
British commitments to Belize, Gibraltar and N. Ireland
continued (if not Hong Kong)
Lessons?
do not overestimate developing country's expertise
do not overestimate ability of light infantry to
take high ground without artillery or casualties
distinguish between opposition's better and weaker
forces
strategy of attacking centers of gravity is in tension
with need for incremental victories
conscript forces have limited value
defense reviews must be closely tied to review of
strategic commitments
defense budget cuts must allow for flexible scenarios
intelligence budget must allow for minimal capability
in low priority areas
weapons platforms and systems need flexible use
Light armored vehicles and VSTOL all-weather subsonic
aircraft are viable
but Rapier needed adaptation to humid marine environment
infantry need training in amphibious warfare for
flexible scenarios
infantry need land-based, portable artillery (105mm
or light tank) support
jointness requires cross training, mixed personnel
3 Cdo Brigade (paras, royal marines) functioned well
as infantry spearhead
but cannibalized 5 army guards brigade did not achieve
functional coherence.
painful vulnerability of surface vessels and fixed
land defenses -- again
STUFT requisitioned ships, although cost effective
transport, need defensive equipment.