Brief Presentation at SAASS, July 9, 2003:
"Strategy versus Politics, Technology versus Expertise:
on the Twenty-first anniversary of the Battle of the Falklands /Malvinas, May-June 1982."
Revised 8 July 2003.  By Jeremy Lewis
Associate Professor of Political Science, with tenure, Huntingdon College.
  • "Any civilian who attempts to write a military history is of necessity guilty of an act of presumption." -- Sir John Fortescue, History of the British Army.
  • Hypotheses:
  • short term political miscalculation, not grand strategy, caused battle
  • developing country met developed country on roughly equal technological terms
  • Argentina, 1982: pop. 30 m, income $7,000 per capita.
  • UK, 1982: pop 60 m, income $21,000 per capita.
  • differences of expertise, not technology, caused success in ground war
  • internal repression function of armies interferes with combat function
  • missiles demonstrated effectiveness on both sides
  • mobile, light weapons effective in power projection
  • outcomes indicated consequences of political conflict without economics
  • Strategy versus Politics -- on both sides
  • conflicting claims to sovereignty
  • United Kingdom's historical limited investiture, plantation, and support
  • UK's modern doubts about retention, development, cost of communications
  • Argentina's constitutional claim to Malvinas
  • Questionable strategic value of islands to either side
  • UK political concerns:
  • Conservative government's military budget cuts without reducing commitments
  • decolonizing Falklands and Belize in conflict with self-determination
  • implications for Gibraltar, N. Ireland (if not Hong Kong)
  • remoteness of Falklands and South Georgias
  • hostage to stubborn conservatism of small colonial population
  • impending reduction of naval forces, especially capital ships and air power
  • impending withdrawal of exploration ship, HMS Endurance
  • lack of progress on decolonizing Falklands, 1970s
  • Argentina's political concerns:
  • Peronist revival in government, ardent nationalism
  • changed leadership of junta
  • domestic political dissent, riots
  • economic recession, inflation
  • popular reactions to decade of repression (of Tupamaros, desapparecidos)
  • Falklands population's concerns:
  • maintenance of colonial status, stubborn resistance to change
  • lack of economic development
  • dependence on communications via mainland Argentina
  • attrition of females of child-bearing age owing to small garrison
  • Argentine result:
  • misled by British signals of unwillingness to defend Malvinas
  • poor timing of the Argentine invasion, before UK capability reduced
  • incomplete political and military planning
  • mitigated by diversion of forces from current exercise
  • British results
  • hasty departure of HM fleet, improvised planning of supplies & logistics
  • amphibious ships hastily returned to active duty
  • only one UK amphibious brigade improvised successfully
  • minimal intelligence available until scouting accomplished
  • second infantry brigade cannibalized, unready till final battle
  • diplomatic scramble to win favor of UN, US.
  • strategy of attacking center of gravity (Port Stanley) was in tension with need for incremental victories (at South Georgias, Goose Green, Pebble Island.)
  • Differentials in diplomacy
  • by invading, Argentina lost anticolonial advantage in latin America (Peru, Chile)
  • Argentina overestimated US support (Amb. Kirkpatrick at UN)
  • UK successful with US (Sec. State Al. Haig)
  • UK successful at UN (Sir Anthony Parsons)
  • Latin American leadership of UN (Peru's Perez de Cuellar) neutralized (by Haig /Cuellar plan.)
  • Differentials in public information
  • Argentina's over optimistic propaganda soon disproven, intensified political failure
  • UK control in theatre over reporters' communications, factual statements
  • UK failures in London in leaking operational security material (Goose Green)
  • Similar, moderate levels of technology
  • best examples: (Type 22 & 42 ships, exocet missiles, helicopters, MGs)
  • some small advantages for developing country: (PNGs, helicopters, foul weather clothing)
  • naval power
  • corvettes, frigates (type 21 and 22) and destroyers (type 42)
  • light attack helicopters
  • diesel submarines (UK nuclear subs the major exception)
  • capital ships
  • rotary aircraft
  • medium and heavy lift (Puma, Sea King, Chinook)
  • light lift & attack (Gazelle, Scout, Lynx)
  • fixed wing aircraft
  • fighters /bombers /ground attack (Harrier, Skyhawk, Mirage, Pucará)
  • long range bombing capability (Vulcan, C-130)
  • transport (C-130)
  • logistics
  • distances neutralized British advantage of naval forces
  • naval and aerial refueling made possible British power projection; but Argentine fighters unable to dogfight
  • resupply (RAS) in difficult seas essential for British power projection
  • repair (Stena Seaspread) by commercial salvage saved some British ships
  • STUFT requisitions proved their value for British cost effective transport
  • weaponry
  • guided missiles:
  • AIM (AIM 9L sidewinder)
  • SAM (Sea Cat, Sea Dart, Sea Wolf, Rapier, Roland)
  • AS (Exocet, AS-12, Sea Skua)
  • ground: Milan
  • small arms: (Stirling /PAM, SLR /FN, Bren LMG /Mag, GPMG.)
  • light tracked vehicles (Volvo Snowcat, Scimitar & Scorpion)
  • major exception: UK nuclear attack submarine HMS Conqueror sank cruiser Belgrano.
  • Differentials in Expertise
  • closest to equality in Argentine air forces and 5th marines
  • great in naval forces: Argentine capital ships and submarines had no successes
  • both armies experienced in internal law and order functions
  • Argentine army primarily conscripted, poorly led, trained and fed (Kon, 1982)
  • Argentine defense static, lacking patrolling
  • UK army trained for scouting, long range patrolling, night attack
  • UK maintenance of aircraft in poor environment successful
  • Operational and Tactical Innovation
  • Argentina
  • air forces adjusted strike tactics daily, threw entire front line stregth against British beachhead.
  • air forces used new Exocet /Super Etendard weapons system
  • (air forces attempted in-flight refuelling?)
  • air forces adopted lear jets to fill gap in navigation capability
  • navy used corvettes for scouting, special forces in invasion
  • but army failed to counter attack over land after British landing
  • but army failed to turn night vision capability into night attacks
  • but army failed to defend mount Kent
  • but army, amid sheep pasture, failed properly to feed conscripts
  • but navy failed to use capital ships, submarine attacks
  • United Kingdom
  • adaptation was required by rapid deployment, reorganization of forces
  • extensive use of special forces (scouting, raids, observation)
  • STUFT requisitioned ships, selected for south Atlantic (no Ro-Ro ferries)
  • adjusted fleet tactics rapidly after attacks (chaff, AAA, damage control systems)
  • attacked Argentine cruiser flotilla outside TEZ to hasten battle
  • adjusted positions of fleet according to operational needs
  • made main amphibious landing in sheltered sound, sacrificing ability of radar for air defense
  • coordinated naval gunnery, as well as ground attack aircraft, with infantry
  • used new weaponry with minimal training (Sea Skua, AIM 9L, PNGs)
  • adapted anti-tank Milan (& 66, and 84mm) rockets to anti-infantry trench use.
  • adjusted tactics to respond to loss of helo-lift (Snow cats, landing ships)
  • long range bombing with daisy-chained tankers, improvised refuelling
  • longest bombing run (14,000 miles) to that date, though missed runway
  • mistakenly sent paratroops to Darwin and Goose Green with inadequate artillery support
  • mistakenly transferred Welsh guards by sea to Bluff Cove in daylight without senior amphibious-trained commander or adequate defense.
  • Outcomes
  • 250 UK, 1200 Argentine losses, mostly of ground troops (cf Falklands population of 1,800)
  • removed front line fighter-bomber strength of Argentine air forces
  • one Argentine cruiser and several smaller ships sank, one submarine beached
  • two British destroyers, several frigates, one container ship and heavy lift helicopters sunk.
  • replacement of junta with democratic regime
  • fortress Falklands, still heavily dependent on communications
  • re-election of Conservatives in UK, 1983, with historic majority, cabinet shift to right
  • reduction of UK forces, naval in particular, continued
  • British commitments to Belize, Gibraltar and N. Ireland continued (if not Hong Kong)
  • Lessons?
  • do not overestimate developing country's expertise
  • do not overestimate ability of light infantry to take high ground without artillery or casualties
  • distinguish between opposition's better and weaker forces
  • strategy of attacking centers of gravity is in tension with need for incremental victories
  • conscript forces have limited value
  • defense reviews must be closely tied to review of strategic commitments
  • defense budget cuts must allow for flexible scenarios
  • intelligence budget must allow for minimal capability in low priority areas
  • weapons platforms and systems need flexible use
  • Light armored vehicles and VSTOL all-weather subsonic aircraft are viable
  • but Rapier needed adaptation to humid marine environment
  • infantry need training in amphibious warfare for flexible scenarios
  • infantry need land-based, portable artillery (105mm or light tank) support
  • jointness requires cross training, mixed personnel
  • 3 Cdo Brigade (paras, royal marines) functioned well as infantry spearhead
  • but cannibalized 5 army guards brigade did not achieve functional coherence.
  • painful vulnerability of surface vessels and fixed land defenses -- again
  • STUFT requisitioned ships, although cost effective transport, need defensive equipment.
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